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Cryptocurrencies are among the largest unregulated markets in the world. We find that approximately 
one-quarter of bitcoin users are involved in illegal activity. We estimate that around $76 billion of illegal 
activity per year involves bitcoin (46% of bitcoin transactions), which is close to the scale of the US and 
European markets for illegal drugs. The illegal share of bitcoin activity declines with mainstream interest 
in bitcoin and with the emergence of more opaque cryptocurrencies. The techniques developed in this 
paper have applications in cryptocurrency surveillance. Our findings suggest that cryptocurrencies are 
transforming the black markets by enabling “black e-commerce”.    (JEL G18, O31, O32, O33) 
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Cryptocurrencies have grown rapidly in price, popularity, and mainstream adoption. Over 1,800 
cryptocurrencies exist with market capitalization exceeding $300 billion as at July 2018. Bitcoin, the 
largest cryptocurrency, accounts for around half of the total market capitalization. The numerous online 
cryptocurrency exchanges and markets have daily dollar volume of around $50 billion.
1
 Over 170 
“cryptofunds” have emerged (hedge funds that invest solely in cryptocurrencies), attracting around $2.3 
billion in assets under management.
2
 Recently, bitcoin futures have commenced trading on the CME and 
CBOE, catering to institutional demand for trading and hedging bitcoin.
3
 What was once a fringe asset is 
quickly maturing. 
The rapid growth in cryptocurrencies and the anonymity that they provide users has created 
considerable regulatory challenges. An application for a $100 million cryptocurrency Exchange Traded 
Fund (ETF) was rejected by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in March 2017 (and 
several more rejected in 2018) amid concerns including the lack of regulation. The Chinese government 
banned residents from trading cryptocurrencies and made initial coin offerings (ICOs) illegal in 
September 2017. Central bank heads, such as the Bank of England’s Mark Carney, have publicly 
expressed concerns about cryptocurrencies. While cryptocurrencies have many potential benefits 
including faster and more efficient settlement of payments, regulatory concerns center around their use in 
illegal trade (drugs, hacks and thefts, illegal pornography, even murder-for-hire), potential to fund 
terrorism, launder money, and avoid capital controls. There is little doubt that by providing a digital and 
anonymous payment mechanism, cryptocurrencies such as bitcoin have facilitated the growth of online 
“darknet” marketplaces in which illegal goods and services are traded. The recent FBI seizure of over $4 
million worth of bitcoin from one such marketplace, the “Silk Road,” provides some idea of the scale of 
the problem faced by regulators. 
This paper seeks to quantify and characterize the illegal trade facilitated by bitcoin. In doing so, 
we hope to better understand the nature and scale of the “problem” facing this nascent technology. We 
develop new methods for identifying illegal activity in bitcoin. These methods can also be used in 
analyzing many other blockchains. Several recent seizures of bitcoin by law enforcement agencies 
(including the US FBI’s seizure of the “Silk Road” marketplace), combined with the public nature of the 
blockchain, provide us with a unique laboratory in which to analyze the illegal ecosystem that has 
evolved in the bitcoin network. Although individual identities are masked by the pseudo-anonymity of a 
26-35 character alpha-numeric address, the public nature of the blockchain allows us to link bitcoin 
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 SEC Release No. 34-79103, March 10, 2017; and https://coinmarketcap.com. 
2
 Source: financial research firm Autonomous Next and cnbc.com. 
3
 Bitcoin futures commenced trading on the CME (Chicago Mercantile Exchange) on December 18, 2017 and on the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) on December 10, 2017. A bitcoin futures contract on CBOE is for one 
bitcoin, whereas on CBOE it is five bitcoins. At a price of approximately $20,000 per bitcoin at the time the CME 
bitcoin futures launched, one CME bitcoin futures contract has a notional value of around $100,000.  
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transactions to individual “users” (market participants) and then further identify the users that had bitcoin 
seized by authorities. Bitcoin seizures (combined with a few other sources) provide us with a sample of 
users known to be involved in illegal activity. This is the starting point for our analysis, from which we 
apply two different empirical approaches to go from the sample to the estimated population of illegal 
activity. 
Our first approach exploits the trade networks of users known to be involved in illegal activity 
(“illegal users”). We use the bitcoin blockchain to reconstruct the complete network of transactions 
between market participants. We then apply a type of network cluster analysis to identify two distinct 
communities in the data—the legal and illegal communities. Our second approach exploits certain 
characteristics that distinguish between legal and illegal bitcoin users. We use these characteristics in 
simultaneous equation models that identify the illegal activity while accounting for the non-randomness 
of the sample of known illegal users. For example, we measure the extent to which individual bitcoin 
users take actions to conceal their identity and trading records, which predicts involvement in illegal 
activity.  
We find that illegal activity accounts for a substantial proportion of the users and trading activity 
in bitcoin. For example, approximately one-quarter of all users (26%) and close to one-half of bitcoin 
transactions (46%) are associated with illegal activity. Furthermore, approximately one-fifth (23%) of the 
total dollar value of transactions and approximately one-half of bitcoin holdings (49%) through time are 
associated with illegal activity using our algorithms. Our estimates suggest that in April 2017, there are an 
estimated 27 million bitcoin market participants that use bitcoin primarily for illegal purposes. These 
users annually conduct around 37 million transactions, with a value of around $76 billion, and 
collectively hold around $7 billion worth of bitcoin. 
To give these numbers some context, a report to the US White House Office of National Drug 
Control Policy estimates that drug users in the United States in 2010 spend in the order of $100 billion 
annually on illicit drugs.
4
 Using different methods, the size of the European market for illegal drugs is 
estimated to be at least €24 billion per year.
5
 While comparisons between such estimates and ours are 
imprecise for a number of reasons and the illegal activity captured by our estimates is broader than just 
illegal drugs, they do provide a sense that the scale of the illegal activity involving bitcoin is not only 
meaningful as a proportion of bitcoin activity, but also in absolute dollar terms.  
                                                          
4
 The report, prepared by the RAND Corporation, estimates the user of cocaine, crack, heroin, marijuana, and 
methamphetamine, and is available at (www.rand.org/t/RR534). A significant share of the illegal activity involving 
bitcoin is likely associated with buying/selling illegal drugs online (e.g., Soska and Christin, 2015), which is what 
motivates the comparison with the size of the market for illegal drugs. 
5
 The estimate is from the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction / Europol “EU Drug Markets 
Report” for the year 2013 (http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/att_194336_EN_TD3112366ENC.pdf). 
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We also uncover that the use of bitcoin in illegal trade varies through time. Since 2016, the 
proportion of bitcoin activity associated with illegal trade has declined, although the absolute amount has 
continued to increase. We attribute the declining share of illegal activity to two main factors. The first is 
the rapid growth in mainstream and speculative interest in bitcoin, which mechanically decreases the 
illegal share. For example, we find that the proportion of illegal activity in bitcoin is inversely related to 
the Google search intensity for the keyword “bitcoin.” The second factor is the emergence of alternative 
“shadow” cryptocurrencies that are more opaque and better at concealing a user’s activity (e.g., Dash, 
Monero, and ZCash). We find that the emergence of such shadow cryptocurrencies is also associated with 
a decrease in the proportion of illegal activity in bitcoin. Despite the emergence of alternative 
cryptocurrencies and numerous darknet marketplace seizures by law enforcement agencies, the amount of 
illegal activity involving bitcoin at the end of our sample in April 2017 remains close to its all-time high. 
Bitcoin users that are involved in illegal activity differ from other users in several characteristics. 
Illegal users tend to transact more, but in smaller transactions. They are also more likely to repeatedly 
transact with a given counterparty. These differences in transactional characteristics are generally 
consistent with the notion that while illegal users predominantly (or solely) use bitcoin as a payment 
system to facilitate trade in illegal goods/services, some legal users treat bitcoin as an investment or 
speculative asset. Despite transacting more, illegal users tend to hold less bitcoin, consistent with them 
facing risks of having bitcoin holdings seized by authorities. 
We find several other robust predictors of involvement in illegal activity. A user is more likely to 
be involved in illegal activity if they trade when there are more darknet marketplaces in operation, lower 
combined market value of shadow coins, less mainstream interest in bitcoin as measured by Google 
search intensity, and immediately following darknet marketplaces seizures or scams. A user is also more 
likely to be involved in illegal activity if they use “tumbling” and/or “wash trades”—two trading 
techniques that can help conceal one’s activity.  
The network of bitcoin transactions between illegal users is three to four times denser than the 
legal user network, with users much more connected with one another through transactions. The higher 
density is consistent with illegal users transacting more and using bitcoin primarily as a payment system 
for buying/selling goods.  
It is important to consider the differences between cryptocurrencies and cash. After all, cash is 
also largely anonymous (traceable only through serial numbers) and has therefore traditionally played an 
important role in facilitating crime and illegal trade (e.g., Rogoff, 2016). The key difference is that 
cryptocurrencies (similar to PayPal and credit cards) enable digital transactions and thus e-commerce. 
Arguably, the ability to make digital payments revolutionized retail and wholesale trade. Online shopping 
substantially impacted the structure of retailing, consumption patterns, choice, marketing, competition, 
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and ultimately supply and demand. Until cryptocurrencies, such impacts were largely limited to legal 
goods and services due to the traceability of digital payments. Cryptocurrencies may have changed this, 
by combining the anonymity of cash with digitization, which enables efficient anonymous online and 
cross-border commerce. Cryptocurrencies therefore have the potential to cause an important structural 
shift in how the black market operates.  
While the emergence of illegal darknet marketplaces illustrates that this shift may have 
commenced, it is not obvious to what extent the black market will adopt the opportunities for e-commerce 
and digital payments via cryptocurrencies. This is an important empirical question. Our findings illustrate 
the dynamics of this adoption process and suggest that eight years after the introduction of the first 
cryptocurrency, the black market has indeed adopted this form of electronic payment on a meaningful 
scale. Thus, our results suggest that cryptocurrencies are having a material impact on the way the black 
market for illegal goods and services operates.  
Our findings have a number of further implications. Blockchain technology and the 
systems/protocols that can be implemented on a blockchain have the potential to revolutionize numerous 
industries. In shedding light on the dark side of cryptocurrencies, we hope this research will reduce some 
of the regulatory uncertainty about the negative consequences and risks of this innovation, facilitating 
more informed policy decisions that assess both the costs and benefits. In turn, we hope this enables these 
technologies to reach their potential. Second, our paper contributes to understanding the intrinsic value of 
bitcoin, highlighting that a significant component of its value as a payment system derives from its use in 
facilitating illegal trade. This has ethical implications for bitcoin as an investment, as well as valuation 
implications. Third, our paper moves the literature closer to understanding the welfare consequences of 
the growth in illegal online trade. A crucial piece of this puzzle is understanding whether illegal online 
trade simply reflects a migration of activity that would have otherwise occurred on the street, versus the 
alternative that by making illegal goods more accessible, convenient to buy, and less risky to buy due to 
anonymity, “black e-commerce” encourages growth in the aggregate black market. Our estimates 
contribute to understanding this issue, but further research is required to relate these estimates to trends in 
the offline black market to further understand the welfare consequences. 
This paper also makes a methodological contribution. The techniques developed in this paper can 
be used in cryptocurrency surveillance in a number of ways, including monitoring trends in illegal 
activity, its response to regulatory interventions, and how its characteristics change through time. The 
methods can also be used to identify key bitcoin users (e.g., “hubs” in the illegal trade network) which, 
when combined with other sources of information, can be linked to specific individuals. The techniques in 
this paper can also be used to study other types of activity in bitcoin or other blockchains.  
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Our paper contributes to a few areas of recent literature. We add to the literature on the economics 
of cryptocurrencies and applications of blockchain technology to securities markets by showing that one 
of the major uses of cryptocurrencies as a payment system is in settings where anonymity is valued (e.g., 
illegal trade).
6
 Our paper also contributes to the computer science literature that analyzes the degree of 
anonymity in bitcoin.
7
 We exploit algorithms from this literature to identify individual users in the data, 
and we add new methods to the literature that go beyond observing individuals, to identification of 
communities and estimation of populations of users. Finally, our paper is also related to studies of darknet 
marketplaces and the online drug trade, including papers from computer science and drug policy.
8
 We 
contribute to this literature by quantifying the amount of illegal activity that involves bitcoin, rather than 
studying a single market (e.g., Silk Road) or indirect lower-bound measures of darknet activity such as 
the feedback left by buyers. Empirically, we confirm that the estimated population of illegal activity is 
several times larger than what can be “observed” through studying known darknet marketplaces and their 
customers. 
The next section provides institutional details about bitcoin and the blockchain, darknet 
marketplaces in which illegal goods and services are bought/sold using bitcoin, and law enforcement 
efforts to monitor and disrupt illegal online activity. Section 2 describes the blockchain data used in this 
paper. Section 3 explains three approaches that we use to construct a sample of illegal activity and 
characterizes that sample. The sample forms the input to our empirical methods in Section 4 that quantify 
the total amount of illegal activity, its trends, and its characteristics. A discussion of the implications of 
the results and how they relate to existing studies is in Section 5, while Section 6 concludes.  
 
1. Institutional details 
 
1.1. The structure of the bitcoin blockchain 
Bitcoin is an international currency, not associated with any country or central bank, backed only 
by its limited total supply and the willingness of bitcoin users to recognize its value.
9
 Bitcoins are 
“mined” (created) by solving cryptographic puzzles that deterministically increase in difficulty and once 
solved can be easily verified. Each solution results in a new “block” and provides the miner with the 
“block reward” (currently 12.5 bitcoins), which incentivizes the miner. The difficulty of the cryptographic 
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 See: Malinova and Park, 2016; Khapko and Zoican, 2016; Yermack, 2017; Huberman et al., 2017; Basu et al., 
2018. 
7
 See: Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Ron and Shamir, 2013; Androulaki et al., 2013; Tasca et al., 2018. 
8
 See: Soska and Christin, 2015; Barratt et al., 2016a; Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016; Van Buskirk et al., 2016. 
9 
As of January 2017, over 16 million bitcoins had been mined out of a maximum of 21 million. This maximum limit 
is built into the protocol (Nakamoto, 2008).  
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puzzles is adjusted after every 2,016 blocks (approximately 14 days) by an amount that ensures the time 
between blocks remains ten minutes on average.  
As well as expanding the supply of bitcoin, each block confirms a collection of recent 
transactions (transactions since the last block). Each block also contains a reference to the last block, 
thereby forming a “chain”, giving rise to the term “blockchain”. The blockchain thus forms a complete 
and sequential record of all transactions and is publically available to any participant in the network. 
Bitcoins are divisible to the “Satoshi”, being one hundred millionth of one bitcoin (currently 
worth less than two hundredths of a cent). Each bitcoin holding (or parcel) is identified by an address, 
analogous to the serial number of a banknote. Unlike banknotes, bitcoin does not have to be held in round 
units (e.g., 5, 10, 50). Due to the revelation of the private key, unless a holding of bitcoin with a given 
address is exactly spent in a transaction, the “change” from the transaction is returned to a new address 
forming a new parcel of bitcoin. 
A bitcoin “user” (a participant in the network) stores the addresses associated with each parcel of 
bitcoin that they own in a “wallet”. Similar to a conventional cash wallet, a bitcoin wallet balance is the 
sum of the balances of all the addresses inside the wallet. While individual bitcoin addresses are designed 
to be anonymous, it is possible to link addresses belonging to the same wallet when more than one 
address is used to make a purchase.  
 
1.2. Darknet marketplaces and their microstructure 
The “darknet” is a network like the internet, but that can only be accessed through particular 
communications protocols that provide greater anonymity than the internet. The darknet contains online 
marketplaces, much like EBay, but with anonymous communications, which also makes these 
marketplaces less accessible than online stores on the internet. Darknet marketplaces are particularly 
popular for trading illegal goods and services because the identities of buyers and sellers are concealed. 
The darknet is estimated to contain approximately 30,000 domains (Lewman, 2016). 
To access a darknet marketplace, a user is generally required to establish an account (usually free) 
at the marketplace to browse vendor products (Martin, 2014a; Van Slobbe, 2016). Similar to the way 
PayPal propelled EBay, the secure, decentralized, and anonymous nature of cryptocurrencies has played 
an important role in the success of darknet marketplaces. While bitcoin is the most widespread 
cryptocurrency used in such marketplaces, other currencies have occasionally been adopted, either due to 
their popularity (such as Ethereum) or improved anonymity (such as Monero). Despite the availability of 
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A user that wants to buy goods or services on a darknet marketplace must first acquire 
cryptocurrency (typically from an online exchange or broker) and then deposit this in an address 
belonging to the darknet marketplace (often termed a “hot wallet”). These funds are held in “escrow” by 
the marketplace. Vendor prices on darknet markets are often quoted inclusive of a marketplace fee. The 
escrow system also assists marketplace administrators in mediating disputes between buyers and sellers 
and minimizing scams in which money is collected without the intention of ever shipping any goods 
(Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2014; Christin, 2013). Funds are released when the vendor indicates the 
goods have been sent. In some marketplaces, the funds are held until the buyer indicates that the goods 
have been received. The escrow function of the darknet marketplaces sometimes leads to “exit scams”, 
whereby a marketplace ceases operations but does not return bitcoin held in escrow. Many such scams 
have been perpetrated by marketplaces in the last five years, including Sheep Marketplace (2013), Pirate 
Market (2014), Evolution (2015), and Nucleus (2016).  
The evolution of dark marketplaces allows sellers of illegal goods and services to reach global 
audiences (Van Buskirk et al., 2016). This internationalization of illegal trade necessitates more complex 
methods of communications and logistics to avoid detection. To this end, buyers placing an order with an 
online seller typically communicate using PGP (Pretty Good Privacy) encryption, which encodes and 
decodes messages using a pair of public and private keys (Cox, 2016). On some (typically more recent) 
marketplaces, this functionality is built into the site. Logistically, items are typically delivered by mail 
and the process by which this occurs has been widely documented (Christin, 2013; Van Hout and 
Bingham, 2013; Lavorgna, 2016; Van Slobbe, 2016). Many methods are used to minimize the chance of 
such deliveries being intercepted by law enforcement, including professional logos, vacuum sealed bags, 
posting small quantities of product, and including a (fake) return address (Christin, 2013; Basu, 2014; 
Tzanetakis et al., 2016). Customers are advised by marketplaces to avoid using their real name or address 
to minimize the risk of being caught by law enforcement agencies (Martin, 2014b).  
After receiving their goods, buyers are encouraged to leave feedback about the seller, 
commenting on the arrival (or otherwise) of the goods, their quality, and overall service (Van Slobbe, 
2016). Such feedback is paramount for developing a reputation in a marketplace that is primarily based on 
trust between participants, with few ramifications for “scamming” purchasers (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 
2014; Tzanetakis et al., 2016). 
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To get a sense of how a buyer navigates a darknet marketplace, Figure 1 provides screenshots 
from one of the first darknet marketplaces, “Silk Road”. Panel A provides an example of the “Drugs” 
page illustrating that a wide variety of illegal drugs, weapons, and forgeries can be purchased using 
bitcoin. Panel B provides an example of information about individual items and sellers. Clicking on the 
appropriate headings, one can obtain further information about the items (detailed description, 
insurance/refund policies, available postage methods and locations, security and encryption, and so on) 
and about the seller (their rating from buyers, detailed feedback from buyers, history of sales, and so on). 
Panel C shows the interface for depositing bitcoin to Silk Road’s escrow account, how to transfer bitcoins 
to a given seller, and how to withdraw bitcoins from escrow. 
 
< Figure 1 > 
 
By providing an anonymous, digital method of payment, bitcoin did for darknet marketplaces 
what PayPal did for EBay—provide a reliable, scalable, and convenient payment mechanism. What was 
also required was an anonymous way of hosting and accessing those illegal marketplaces. This issue is 
solved through the use of The Onion Router (TOR), originally developed by the US Navy. By routing the 
message through several nodes, the TOR network obfuscates the path (and hence the IP address) of a 
message sent between two clients.  
The combination of TOR for covert communications and bitcoin for covert payments has led to 
the proliferation of darknet marketplaces. The most well-known marketplace was the “Silk Road” started 
in 2011. Since its shutdown by the FBI in 2013, numerous other marketplaces have sprung up (see Table 
A1 in Appendix A for a list). Despite frequent shutdowns, seizures and scams, measures of darknet 
marketplace activity indicate steady growth in the number of market participants and products (Matthews 
et al., 2017). For example, one of the largest marketplaces in 2017, “AlphaBay”, had over 350,000 items 
available for sale in categories such as drugs, weapons, malware, and illegal pornography.  
 
1.3. Surveillance and cryptocurrency seizures from darknet marketplaces 
Cryptocurrencies have proven effective not only in facilitating illegal trade, but also in the 
detection of illegal activity due to the public nature of the blockchain. Even though bitcoin has been used 
extensively in illegal activity, some argue that the blockchain actually makes it easier for law enforcement 
to detect illegal activity, despite the currency’s anonymity. Koshy, Koshy, and McDaniel (2014) show 
that by monitoring transactions transmitted from computers to the blockchain, they are able to link 
individual transactions to the IP address of the sender. Meiklejohn et al. (2013) describe how tracing a 
bitcoin theft on the blockchain to bitcoin exchanges could be used by authorities with subpoena powers to 
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potentially identify perpetrators. Yermack (2017) hypothesizes that the growing popularity of bitcoin will 
inevitably lead to a growing market for de-anonymizing technologies, leading to increased transparency 
of the users making transactions on the blockchain. In response to these pressures, supporters of the 
anonymity provided by cryptocurrencies are actively developing new currencies that challenge law 
enforcement’s detection methods. Such currencies include Monero, which hides user’s public keys among 
a group of public keys that contain the same amount (known as “Ring Signatures”), and ZCash (launched 
in 2016), which uses zero-knowledge proofs that hide sender, recipient, and transaction amount (Noether, 
2015; Ben-Sasson et al., 2014).
 
 
Recently, law enforcement agencies have been successful in seizing bitcoin from a number of 
darknet marketplaces. For example, the Silk Road marketplace was raided by the FBI on October 2, 2013, 
seizing bitcoin from customer and supplier escrow accounts (hot wallets) and from the owner/operator, 
Ross William Ulbricht. After the closure of the Silk Road, law enforcement agencies successfully seized 
bitcoin from several other illegal sites/individuals (see Table A2 of Appendix A). Numerous darknet sites 
were raided and shut down in “Operation Onymous”; an international collaboration between US and 
European law enforcement agencies that targeted illegal darknet sites. Despite the seizures, illegal darknet 
marketplaces continue to operate, with many new ones created after each seizure. 
The seized bitcoin from these operations allows us to identify bitcoin users (customers, suppliers, 
and marketplace operators) involved in illegal activity. These observations provide a starting point from 
which to estimate the extent of illegal activity involving bitcoin.  
Law enforcement agencies use a number of strategies to detect illegal activity on the darknet, 
ranging from cyber-surveillance to forensic analysis. Given that detected illegal activity feeds into our 
identification techniques, it is important to understand law enforcement strategies. Christin (2013) and 
Kruithof et al. (2016) describe a number of such strategies, including: infiltrating the TOR network to 
determine individual IP addresses, decoding the financial infrastructure of bitcoin to identify individuals, 
and using traditional forensic and investigative techniques on seized packages. Law enforcement agencies 
monitor suspicious packages passing through the postal service. Agencies also order drugs on darknet 
marketplaces to investigate the return address on the package. For example, an unusual amount of 
outgoing mail from a large Australian drug dealer led authorities to seize over 24,000 in bitcoin, along 
with a wide array of drugs and cash. Investigators also sometimes pose as suppliers to gather addresses of 
customers, thereby revealing their identities. Finally, by conducting major seizures, agencies can create 
distrust in the online trade of illegal drugs among participants (Van Slobbe, 2016; Christin, 2013). Large-
scale initiatives such as “Operation Onymous”, in which law enforcement agencies shut down several 
illegal marketplaces and made 17 arrests across 17 countries, can discourage illegal online activity by 
increasing the risk of detection (Franklin, Paxson, Perrig, and Savage, 2007). 
10 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
We extract the complete record of bitcoin transactions from the public bitcoin blockchain, from 
the first block on January 3, 2009, to the end of April 2017. For each transaction, we collect the unique 
transaction hash, the transaction amount, the fee, the sender and recipient addresses, the timestamp, and 
the block number. 
 
2.1 Identifying users in transaction-level bitcoin data 
The data that make up the bitcoin blockchain reveal “addresses” (identifiers for parcels of bitcoin) 
but not the “users” (individuals) that control those addresses. A user typically controls several addresses. 
This one-to-many mapping occurs partly as a result of various activities that users employ to preserve 
their anonymity and partly due to transaction mechanics (e.g., when a user receives “change” in a 
transaction, the change is given a new address).
11
 We map addresses to individual users with the Union-
Find algorithm developed by Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest, and Stein (2001) and Ron and Shamir (2013) 
and used in several related papers such as Meiklejohn et al. (2013). This algorithm transforms the 
transaction-level data into user-level data, linking each transaction to the associated users.  
The following illustrates how the Union-Find algorithm works. A transaction usually involves 
several addresses from one user. For example, the payer (“sender”) of bitcoin might send bitcoin from 
multiple addresses and receive change to a new address. Because a user must control the private key of 
each address from which bitcoin is sent in a given transaction, in the first step of the algorithm all of the 
sender’s addresses in a given transaction are associated with one user. Transitivity is then used to link the 
addresses of a user across multiple transactions. For example, suppose two separate transactions are 
observed; one in which bitcoin is sent from addresses A and B and another in which bitcoin is sent from 
addresses B and C. The first transaction identifies that addresses A and B belong to one user, while the 
second identifies that B and C belong to one user. By transitivity, all three addresses (A, B, and C) belong 
to the same user.  
None of the existing algorithms that cluster bitcoin addresses by user has perfect accuracy.
12
 The 
Union-Find algorithm is the most widely used approach, primarily because the errors it makes (too little 
clustering of addresses rather than too much clustering) are conservative in most applications (Meiklejohn 
et al, 2013). The Union-Find algorithm might fail to cluster together two sets of addresses controlled by 
one user if that user never makes a transaction that uses an address from both sets. In such instances, two 
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 For example, individuals can send bitcoin to a “tumbling” service which then returns the bitcoin (minus a fee) to a 
new address, or by sending bitcoin to oneself using a newly generated address as the recipient of the transaction 
(Ron and Shamir, 2013). 
12
 For example, Androulaki et al. (2013) examine two approaches using simulations and find that many, but not all, 




or more address clusters might in fact correspond to one user.
13
 In contrast, the Union-Find algorithm 
(unlike other approaches such as those that exploit the change from transactions) is very unlikely to make 
the opposite and more severe error of incorrectly clustering together sets of addresses that involve more 
than one user. The Union-Find algorithm is a suitable choice in our application because too little 
clustering (and thus having instances where two or more clusters correspond to one actual user) is 
unlikely to have severe consequences for our empirical methods, whereas incorrectly joining multiple 
users into a single cluster would be far more problematic.
14
  
The Union-Find algorithm’s tendency to join too few addresses together into clusters adds bias to 
some of the measures in this paper. First, the sample of known illegal users, which is the starting point for 
our empirical analysis, will not contain all of the addresses controlled by those users. We therefore start 
with a smaller sample than would be the case if the clustering algorithm had 100% accuracy. Second, 
measures of the number of users will be upward biased because in some cases, two or more of the clusters 
identified by the Union-Find algorithm will in fact be controlled by one real user. Consequently, our 
estimates of the total number of bitcoin users, the number of illegal users, and the number of legal users 
are all likely upward biased. For similar reasons, measures such as the number of transactions per user or 
holdings per user are likely downward biased. This bias is less of an issue when we quantify users as 
percentages of the total number of users. For example, our estimates of the percentage of users that are 
involved in illegal activity will be less biased than the absolute number of users. This bias is even less of 
an issue when we quantify the number of transactions, volume, or holdings of various groups of users 
because these measures do not rely on knowing the number of users in each group.  
 
2.2 Filters and data transformations 
 Our blockchain dataset consists of 465,093 blocks containing 219.6 million bitcoin transactions 
(unique transaction hashes). In the raw blockchain data, one transaction can have several recipients. For 
example, in a single transaction, Alice could send five bitcoins to Bob, two bitcoins to Charlie, and 0.1 
bitcoins to the miner of the block as a transaction fee. We split these raw “compound” transactions up into 
their components such that each transaction has only one sender and one receiver. In the previous 
example, Alice’s compound transaction would become three separate transactions: one with Bob, one 
with Charlie, and one being a transaction fee sent to the block miner. Among other things, this allows us 
to separate transaction fees and block rewards from other transactions. After splitting compound 
transactions into their components, we have 815.4 million transactions. 
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 Meiklejohn et al. (2013) empirically find that this error is “not too common” in bitcoin blockchain analysis. 
14
 For example, if a single user appears in the data as two or more clusters, all of those clusters could be correctly 
classified with the user’s actual type (illegal or legal), whereas if a legal and illegal user are incorrectly clustered 
together, there is no way to assign a correct classification to the cluster. 
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In this study, we are primarily interested in quantifying the amount of illegal trade that uses 
bitcoin. We therefore remove transaction fees and block rewards from the sample to avoid distorting the 
transaction counts. This step removes 208.3 million transactions. We also remove currency conversion 
transactions (conversions between bitcoin and fiat currency or other cryptocurrencies), by removing 
bitcoin exchanges and their 88.4 million transactions. These transactions do not involve trade in the sense 
of buying or selling goods or services and would therefore inflate our measures of transaction activity.
15
 
For similar reasons, we remove 71.1 million transactions that reflect the “change” given back to a user in 
a given transaction. These transactions are akin to paying for a $30 product with a $50 bill and receiving 




 We also exclude transactions that have a value of less than $1 on the day of the transaction. Such 
transactions reflect negligible transfers of value and are therefore used for purposes such as messages, test 
transactions, and tips.
17
 Failure to exclude these transactions could significantly skew our data, 
particularly measures of the proportion of transactions.  
After applying these filters, we are left with 302.8 million transactions, each having one sender 
and one receiver. Throughout much of the paper we consider user-level statistics such as the number of 
transactions per user. Such measures naturally use double-counted volume as both the sender and receiver 
sides of each transaction are counted. Using double-counted volume, our transaction count is doubled to 
605.7 million bitcoin transactions. 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics of user-level variables 
Our sample has a total of approximately 106 million bitcoin users, who collectively conduct 
approximately 606 million transactions, transferring around $1.9 trillion. For each user, we calculate a 
collection of variables that characterize features of their bitcoin transaction activity (e.g., transaction 
count, transaction size, transaction frequency, and number of counterparties). We also calculate a range of 
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 The exchanges and miners are identified via “Wallet Explorer.” Wallet Explorer joins transactions into “wallets” 
(the equivalent of our “users”) using a similar procedure to the one described above and then classifies wallets by 
type either on the basis of (i) having observed an address being advertised as part of a given entity (e.g., a known 
address from a bitcoin exchange), or (ii) having identified an entity’s wallet by sending a small amount of bitcoin to 
the entity, where that address is linked to the larger wallet of the entity (similar to Meiklejohn et al., 2013). See 
https://www.walletexplorer.com.  
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 The bitcoin protocol forces a user to spend the entire balance of a bitcoin address when the address is used in a 
transaction. Therefore, when a user has say 50 bitcoins in address A and wants to send another user say 30 bitcoins, 
the compound transaction would have two components: one transaction sending 30 bitcoins from address A to the 
other user and another transaction sending the remaining 20 bitcoins from address A to a new address B that is 
controlled by the sending user.  The latter of the two transactions is the “change” and is removed from our sample.  
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user-level variables that are more specific indicators of the nature of the activity in which a user is likely 
to be engaged, such as the number of illegal darknet marketplaces that operate at the time the user 
transacts, the extent to which the user engages in transactions designed to conceal their activity, and the 
degree of interest in bitcoin at the time the user transacts (using Google search intensity). The detailed 
definitions of these variables are reported in Table 1. 
 
< Table 1 > 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics about the user-level variables. Focusing on the variables that 
characterize a user’s bitcoin transaction activity (Panel A), we see that a typical (median) user engages in 
three bitcoin transactions (mean Transaction Count is 5.7 transactions) with three different counterparties 
(mean of Counterparties is around 4.2). Thus, a typical user has a low degree of concentration in 
counterparties, in that they do not repeatedly transact with the same counterparty (our measure of 
Concentration, which is a normalized Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, has a median of zero). There are a 
small number of highly active entities, with the most active having almost 11.4 million transactions and 
4.4 million counterparties.  
The average transaction size is around $5,000, but a typical transaction (the median Transaction 
Size) is much smaller at $112. Some transactions are very large, with the largest exceeding $90 million. 
For most users, their first and last bitcoin transaction occurs within the same month (the median Existence 
Time is one month), although some users are present for many years (the maximum Existence Time is 101 
months, or just over eight years). The other variables (Panel B) are more specific indicators of the nature 
of the activity in which a user is likely to be engaged and are thus important in our empirical models. We 
therefore define and discuss these variables when we turn to the empirical models. 
 
< Table 2 > 
 
3. Identifying a sample of illegal users 
We identify a sample of addresses (and therefore users) involved in illegal activity using three 
approaches described below.  
 
3.1. First approach: Bitcoin seizures by law enforcement agencies 
Our first approach exploits bitcoin seizures by law enforcement agencies such as the US FBI. We 
manually identify bitcoin seizures from news articles (via searches using Factiva) and US court records 
(via searches of the digital PACER records). Table A2 in Appendix A reports the list of seizures that we 
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use. For each seizure, we extract information from court records and law enforcement agency disclosures 
about any identified bitcoin addresses or transactions (amounts and dates). From these details we uniquely 
identify the users involved in the illegal activity, by matching up the bitcoin address or transaction 
identifier with our user-level data constructed from the bitcoin blockchain.  
In some cases (e.g., the US FBI’s seizure of Silk Road and Ross Ulbricht’s holdings, and the 
Australian law enforcement’s seizure of Richard Pollard’s holdings) the law enforcement agency 
auctioned the seized bitcoin to the public. Selling seized assets that are not themselves illegal is common 
practice among law enforcement agencies. Given the public nature of the auctions, we are able to identify 
the auction transactions on the bitcoin blockchain and work backwards to identify the seized bitcoin 
addresses, which in turn identify those individuals that were involved in illegal activity and had some or 
all of their bitcoin holdings seized by law enforcement agencies. Using this approach we identify 1,016 
known illegal users, which we refer to as “Seized Users”.  
 
3.2. Second approach: Illegal darknet marketplaces and their users 
Our second approach exploits the known “hot wallets” of major illegal darknet marketplaces. 
These are central accounts, many of which operate like escrow accounts, into which users of darknet 
marketplaces deposit or withdraw funds. We are able to identify 17 such marketplaces using data from the 
Wallet Explorer service, which in turn identifies these marketplaces using an approach similar to 
Meiklejohn et al. (2013), i.e., on the basis of small “probing” transactions undertaken with a given entity.  
From these hot wallets, we identify slightly over six million darknet marketplace users as 
individuals that send to and/or receive bitcoin from a known darknet marketplace. We refer to the darknet 
marketplace hot wallets and their contributors/recipients as “Black Market Users”.  
An underlying assumption is that the trade that occurs in darknet marketplaces is illegal. This 
assumption is supported by ample anecdotal evidence, objective empirical evidence in the form of darknet 
market scrapes that show the goods and services traded there (e.g., Christin, 2013; Aldridge Décary-Hétu, 
2014; Van Buskirk et al., 2014; Soska and Christin, 2015), as well as actions by law enforcement 
agencies, including indiscriminate seizures of all bitcoin from such markets.  
 
3.3. Third approach: Users identified in darknet forums 
Our third approach exploits information contained in the darknet, in particular the bitcoin 
addresses of users identified in darknet forums as selling goods/services. We use systematic scrapes of 
darknet forums from 2013 to 2017.
18
 This allows us to identify users that might never have been caught 
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 A list of known darknet markets is in Table A1 of Appendix. An archive of darknet forums during 2013-2015 is 
available at https://www.gwern.net/index. We scrape information from active darknet sites during 2016-2017. 
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by authorities and might not be otherwise identified in the data through transactions with known darknet 
marketplaces. Users often post bitcoin addresses in cases such as fraud (they did not receive their goods), 
quality checking, and for the purposes of advertising the address to which funds should be sent, including 
in privately negotiated trade. While other studies have also scraped darknet marketplaces for certain types 
of information (e.g., Soska and Christin, 2015; Van Buskirk et al., 2016), as far as we know no other 
study has used scrapes to identify the bitcoin addresses of illegal users.  
Using this approach, we identify an additional 448 users that were not already identified in either 
of the previous two approaches. We refer to these as “Forum Users”. 
 
3.4. The sample of illegal users 
Table 3 shows the number of illegal users identified using the three approaches above and various 
measures of their activity. Together, there are 6,223,359 “observed” illegal users, representing 5.86% of 
all bitcoin participants. They account for an even larger share of transactions—a total of 196 million 
transactions, or around one-third of all transactions (32.38%). They also account for an even larger share 
of bitcoin holdings—throughout the sample period, the average dollar value of the bitcoin holdings of 
observed illegal users is around $1.3 billion, which is close to half (45.28%) of the average dollar value of 
holdings for all users.
19
 Observed illegal users control around one-quarter (26.33%) of all bitcoin 
addresses and account for approximately 12.96% of the total dollar value of all bitcoin transactions. 
Within the three subgroups of illegal users, the largest group in terms of number of users is the 
“Black market users”, followed by “Seized users” and then “Forum users”. Seized users and Forum users 
are nevertheless meaningful subgroups in terms of their share of total transactions. 
 
< Table 3 > 
 
The results in Table 3 indicate that the sample of “observed” illegal users is already a substantial 
proportion of users and bitcoin transaction activity, without yet having applied methods to estimate the 
population of illegal users/activity. Capturing a relatively large sample of illegal activity is important 
because it provides rich information to our empirical methods that estimate the totality of illegal activity. 
The fact that the sample of illegal activity is drawn from three different approaches is also likely to help 
the subsequent empirical models by providing a more diverse sample.  
A limitation of the sample of observed illegal users is that it predominantly contains users that are 
involved in buying and selling illegal goods and services online in darknet marketplaces. There are other 
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 The average holdings numbers are considerably lower than current holdings because for the first few years of 
bitcoin’s existence, its market capitalization was much lower than it is currently. 
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forms of illegal activity that involve bitcoin, such as money laundering, evasion of capital controls, 
payments in ransomware attacks, and bitcoin thefts. Without an initial sample of these forms of illegal 
activity, our empirical models are likely to underestimate their prevalence. Illegal activity that is similar 
in characteristics to illegal activity in darknet markets, and illegal activity that involves transacting with 
darknet market participants will be captured by our estimates of illegal activity, even if it is not in our 
sample of directly observed illegal activity. However, illegal activity that is dissimilar to darknet market 
activity and does not interact with such participants is unlikely to be captured by our empirical models. 
Thus, our estimates are likely to underestimate some forms of illegal activity involving bitcoin. 
Given the nature of illegal activity could change through time, it is also important that our sample 
of observed illegal users spans different time periods and is not completely concentrated at one point in 
time. Figure 2 indicates that this is the case for our sample of observed illegal users and their activity. 
These time-series show that the observed illegal users are present during all points in time 
throughout our sample period. Their share of activity is highest at the start of the sample in 2009, and then 
again during a period from 2012 to the end of 2015. The first of these periods (the year 2009) is not 
particularly economically meaningful as the first year or two of bitcoin’s existence involves a very small 
number of users and transactions compared to subsequent years. In contrast, the activity in the second 
period, 2012-2015, is meaningful. This period corresponds to the time when illegal darknet marketplaces 
grew rapidly in number and popularity. Silk Road 1 was established in January 2011 and soon became a 
popular venue in which to buy and sell illegal goods and services (e.g., Soska and Christin, 2015). After 
Silk Road 1 was shut down by the US FBI in October of 2013, a large number of other illegal darknet 
marketplaces commenced operating throughout 2013-2015 (see Table A1 of Appendix A). Thus, perhaps 
somewhat unsurprisingly, the peak activity of our sample of observed illegal users coincides with 
substantial darknet marketplace activity. However, we also observe a reasonable number of illegal users 
and illegal activity outside of this peak window. 
 
< Figure 2 > 
 
4. Quantifying and characterizing all illegal activity  
Having identified a substantial sample of bitcoin users that are involved in illegal activity, our 
next step is to use the information in this sample to estimate the totality of illegal activity that uses 
bitcoin. We use two different methods to classify users into those that are primarily involved in illegal 
activity (“illegal users”) and those that are primarily involved in legal activity (“legal users”). 
Subsequently, we measure the size and activity of the two groups. 
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At an intuitive level, the first method exploits the network topology—the information about who 
trades with whom. Trade networks reveal “communities” of users and can thereby identify other illegal 
users that were not part of our initial sample. In contrast, the second method exploits characteristics that 
distinguish illegal users from legal users (controlling for non-random detection).  
Both methods allow a user that was initially classified as an “observed” illegal user to be 
reclassified as a user that is predominantly engaged in legal activity (a “legal user”). Averaging across the 
three categories of observed illegal users, 0.17% of all users (2.84% of observed illegal users) are 
reclassified as legal users by the models that exploit the network topology and 0.60% of all users (10.17% 
of observed illegal users) are reclassified as legal users by the models that exploit characteristics of users. 
The reclassified users reflect both (i) errors in the classification models, and (ii) users that predominantly 
engage in legal activity but have some involvement in illegal activity. The relatively low reclassification 
rates suggest that most of the “observed” illegal users predominantly use bitcoin for illegal activity.  
The two methods provide independent estimates of the illegal activity and its characteristics. 
Given that the methods rely on completely different assumptions and exploit different information, their 
concurrent use provides robustness and the ability to cross-validate results. The methods are described 
below in separate subsections. We then report the results of how many users and how much trade is 
estimated to be associated with illegal activity, after which we characterize the nature of the illegal users 
and their trading activity compared to legal users. 
 
4.1. Method 1: Network cluster analysis 
The first method exploits network topology to identify “communities” of users based on the 
transactions between users. In simple terms, the method works as follows. If users A, B, and C are known 
to be involved in illegal activity (e.g., their bitcoin was seized by law enforcement agencies), a user X that 
trades exclusively or predominantly with users A, B, or C is likely to also be involved in illegal activity. 
Similarly, a user Y that trades predominantly with users that are not identified as illegal is likely to be a 
legal user. This intuition drives the classification of users into legal and illegal on the basis of their 
transaction partners. 
More formally, the method we apply is a network cluster analysis algorithm that takes as inputs 
the set of users (“nodes” in network terminology) and the trades between users (“edges” or “links” in 
network terminology). The output of the algorithm is an assignment of users to communities such that the 
“modularity” of the communities (density of links within communities and sparsity of links between 
communities) is maximized. The method labels a user as illegal (legal) if the disproportionate share of 
their transactions is with members of the illegal (legal) community. The method does not assume that 
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users only engage in either legal or illegal activity—users can do both. Therefore, there will be some 
trades between the legal and illegal communities. 
We apply a variant of the Smart Local Moving (SLM) algorithm developed by Waltman and van 
Eck (2013), adapted to our specific application. The algorithm’s name (“smart moving”) comes from the 
fact that the algorithm finds the underlying community structure in the network by moving nodes from 
one community to another, if such a move improves the model fit. The SLM algorithm is among the 
leading network cluster analysis algorithms.
20
 Applied to our data, the algorithm is as follows: 
 
 Step 1: Assign all the observed illegal users to the illegal community and all of the remaining 
users to the legal community.  
 Step 2: Loop through each user, performing the following action on each: 
o If the user disproportionately transacts with members of the user’s currently assigned 
community, then leave the user in that community
21
; 
o Otherwise, move the user to the other community (if the user is assigned to the 
illegal community, move the user to legal community, and vice versa). 
 Step 3: Repeat Step 2 until, in a complete loop through all users, no user switches between 
communities. At that point the assignment to communities is stable and ensures that each 
member trades disproportionately with other members of the same community.  
 
Due to the iterative nature of the algorithm, not all of the “observed” illegal users will necessarily 
remain in the illegal community. For example, it is possible that some of the users that had bitcoin seized 
by authorities were involved in some illegal activity (hence getting bitcoin seized) but were mainly using 
bitcoin for legal purposes. This will be recognized by the algorithm in Step 2 and the user will be moved 
to the legal community. 
 
4.2. Method 2: Detection-controlled estimation (DCE) 
The second method we use to estimate the population of users involved in illegal activity (“illegal 
users”) is detection-controlled estimation (DCE). Intuitively, this method exploits the differences in the 
characteristics of legal and illegal users of bitcoin to probabilistically identify the population of illegal 
users. If we had a random sample of illegal users and a set of characteristics that differ between legal and 
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 For example, Emmons et al. (2016) in their comparison of multiple methods find that the SLM algorithm 
performs the best in terms of maximizing cluster quality metrics. 
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 “Disproportionately” is if the proportion of transactions the user makes with other members of the same 
community is greater than or equal to the community’s proportion of total transactions. In robustness tests we 
consider the proportion of volume transacted rather than transactions and find consistent results. 
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illegal users (e.g., measures of the extent to which a user has employed tools to conceal their activity), this 
task would be relatively simple and could be achieved with standard techniques (regression, discriminant 
analysis, and so on). A complication is that detection (as in most settings where violators attempt to 
conceal their illegal activity from authorities) is not random, and this non-randomness must be accounted 
for to obtain unbiased estimators.
22
 We use “detection” in the broad sense of an illegal user having been 
identified by any of the three approaches to detecting illegal users described in Section 4.  
Fortunately this econometric challenge is not unique to illegal activity in bitcoin and methods to 
overcome it exist. The same challenge occurs in quantifying other forms of misconduct such as tax 
evasion, fraud, insider trading, and market manipulation, as well as contexts such as nuclear power plant 
safety regulation breaches, cancer detection by mammograms, and so on. The standard tool for these 
settings is DCE. Since its development by Feinstein (1989, 1990), DCE models have been applied to 
various financial misconduct settings including tax evasion (Feinstein, 1991), corporate fraud (Wang et 
al., 2010), and market manipulation (Comerton-Forde and Putniņš, 2014). By explicitly modelling both 
underlying processes (violation and detection) simultaneously, one can obtain unbiased estimates of the 
illegal activity, which is otherwise only partially observed.  
 
< Figure 3 here > 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the two-stage DCE model that we estimate. On the left is the starting point, the 
data, which in our case is the set of all bitcoin users. In the middle we have the two processes, violation 
(undertaking illegal activity) and detection (e.g., bitcoin seizures). On the right-hand side are the joint 
outcomes of those processes: the observable classifications of users into detected illegal users (the set 𝐴) 
and other users (the complement set 𝐴𝐶, comprising legal users and undetected illegal users). 
The first branch models whether a bitcoin user, 𝑖, is predominantly involved in illegal or legal 
activity. This branch is modelled as an unobservable binary process (𝐿1𝑖) driven by a continuous latent 
function (𝑌1𝑖) of a vector of characteristics, 𝑥1𝑖, that can distinguish between legal and illegal users:  





            (𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟)
          (𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑟)
   if     
𝑌1𝑖 > 0 
𝑌1𝑖 ≤ 0 
} 
(2) 
The second branch models whether or not an illegal user is “detected” (they enter our sample of 
observed illegal users). This detection process is modelled as another unobservable binary process (𝐿2𝑖) 
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 A further complication is that the determinants of this non-randomness are not separately observed (unlike, for 
example, non-respondents in a survey, or people that choose not to participate in the labor force) and therefore the 
classic tools to deal with sample selection bias (e.g., Heckman models) cannot be applied. 
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driven by a different continuous latent function (𝑌2𝑖) of a vector of characteristics, 𝑥2𝑖, that affect the 
probability that an illegal user is detected: 






       (𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑)
   𝑖𝑓   
𝑌2𝑖 > 0 
𝑌2𝑖 ≤ 0 
} 
(4) 
Both stages of the model are estimated simultaneously using maximum likelihood. The likelihood 
function for the model is derived in Appendix B. Intuitively, this process finds estimates for the vectors of 
model parameters, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, that maximize the likelihood of the observed data (the classification of 
users into sets 𝐴 and 𝐴𝐶). From the estimates of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, we compute each user’s probability of being 
involved in illegal activity and construct a binary classification of legal and illegal users.  
Similar to the SLM approach, the DCE model does not assume that detected illegal users were 
engaged solely or predominantly in illegal activity. Once the DCE model is estimated, the classification 




Similar to Heckman models, identification in a DCE model without instruments is possible, 
relying on functional form and distributional assumptions. However, more robust identification is 
achieved through instrumental variables that affect one process but not the other. We take the more robust 
route of using instrumental variables. The next subsection describes the instrumental variables and their 
descriptive statistics.  
 
4.3. Variables used in the DCE model and their descriptive statistics 
One of the instrumental variables associated with illegal activity is the extent to which the user 
employs methods to conceal their identity or obfuscate their transaction history. For example, to partially 
conceal their identities from an observer of the bitcoin blockchain, users can use “tumbling” and “wash 
trades” to alter the addresses of their bitcoin holdings, increasing the difficulty of tracing their activity. 
Tumbling, in its simplest form, involves a user sending bitcoin to a tumbling provider who (in return for a 
small fee) returns the balance to a different address controlled by the user. Wash trades involve a user 
sending bitcoin from one address to another (new) address that they also control. Legal users have little 
reason to take such actions to conceal their actions (and incur associated costs). In contrast, users involved 
in illegal activity are likely to use these concealment techniques. As such, the use of tumbling services 
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 For example, suppose a user was involved in some illegal activity and had bitcoin seized by authorities but was 
mainly using bitcoin for legal purposes. Such a user will have characteristics that are similar to those of legal users 
and not very similar to illegal users, which would lead to a classification by the DCE model into the legal user 
category. In contrast, a predominantly illegal user, even if not detected or observed, is likely to have characteristics 
similar to other illegal users and therefore (after controlling for the differences in characteristics due to non-random 
detection) the user is likely to be classified as illegal by the DCE model. 
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and wash trades is likely to be a predictor of whether a user is involved in illegal activity. Importantly (for 
this to be an instrumental variable), using wash trades and tumbling does not alter the probability of 
“detection” by law enforcement agencies via the seizures of bitcoin from darknet sites. The seizures 
confiscated all bitcoin held in darknet marketplace escrow accounts (“hot wallets”) irrespective of 
whether the user employed tumbling or wash trades. For each user, we measure the percentage of their 
transactions that are tumbling or wash trades and call this variable Tumbling.  
Another set of instruments for the likelihood that a user is involved in illegal activity involves 
time-series variables that are likely to correlate with the type of activity in which bitcoin users are 
engaged. For example, for each user we construct a measure of the average number of operational illegal 
darknet marketplaces at the time the user transacts (we label the variable Darknet Sites). All else equal, 
illegal transactions (and thus users involved in illegal activity) are more likely when there is a lot of 
illegal darknet marketplace activity than when there is little or no illegal darknet activity. 
In a similar spirit, we construct a measure of the popularity of opaque cryptocurrencies (Dash, 
Monero, and ZCash). This measure, which we label Shadow Coins, is the average log market 
capitalization of the opaque cryptocurrencies at the time of a user’s transaction. These “shadow coins” 
were developed to provide more privacy than bitcoin. If criminals are drawn to these shadow coins and 
start using them instead of bitcoin, the probability that a bitcoin user is involved in illegal activity will be 
inversely related to the market capitalization of such coins. 
We also measure the popularity of bitcoin using its log market capitalization and the Google 
Trends search intensity for the keyword “bitcoin”. We label these variables Bitcoin Market Cap and 
Bitcoin Hype, respectively. We also measure the popularity of other cryptocurrencies using the total log 
market capitalization of cryptocurrencies excluding bitcoin and the shadow coins (we label the variable 
Alt Coins). We measure these three variables at the time of each user’s transaction and then for each user 
we average each variable across the user’s transactions. To the extent that these variables correlate with 
speculative trading in bitcoin and mainstream (legal) use of cryptocurrencies, they will have an inverse 
association with the likelihood that a given user is involved in illegal activity. To avoid issues with co-
linearity, we do not concurrently include Bitcoin Market Cap and Bitcoin Hype in the DCE models. 
Our final instrument for involvement in illegal activity exploits the anecdotal evidence that 
significant darknet marketplace shocks such as seizures of darknet marketplaces by law enforcement 
agencies or closures of such marketplaces due to scams or hacks result in a brief spike of transaction 
activity by illegal users as they turn to alternative marketplaces or relocate their holdings in response to 
the shock. At the same time, shocks to darknet marketplaces are unlikely to materially affect the activity 
of legal users. Therefore, for each user, we measure the fraction of the user’s transaction value that occurs 
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in the one week period after each major darknet marketplace shock (marketplace “raids”, “scams”, and 
“hacks” in Table A1 of Appendix A). We label this variable Darknet Shock Volume. 
As determinants of the probability of detection, we include a binary variable for whether the user 
started using bitcoin (date of first bitcoin transaction) before the first bitcoin seizure by law enforcement 
agencies from Silk Road 1 (we label the variable Pre-Silk-Road User). Because users that enter the 
bitcoin network after the first seizure can only be detected in subsequent seizures, post-Silk-Road-seizure 
users are likely to have a lower detection probability.  
A few things are worth noting about the variables used in the DCE model. First, while the 
instrumental variables help identify the model, they are not the only characteristics that help separate legal 
and illegal users—the full set of characteristics used in the model serve that purpose, including variables 
common to both detection and violation equations (they have different coefficients in each equation). The 
full list of variables is presented in Table 1. Second, identification of the model requires only one variable 
that is associated with either the probability of being involved in illegal activity or the probability of 
detection, but not both. We have more candidate instrumental variables than this minimum of one, and in 
robustness tests we examine how sensitive the results are to the assumptions about these instruments. We 
do so by relaxing the assumed exclusion restrictions on a subset of the instruments one at a time, from 
which we conclude that the results are not particularly sensitive to any individual instrumental variable’s 
exclusion restriction. 
Table 2 Panel B reports descriptive statistics about the variables that serve as instruments. 
Darknet Sites indicates that for the average bitcoin participant, there are on average 17 operational 
darknet marketplaces around the time of their transactions. This number ranges from a minimum of zero 
to a maximum of 27. Tumbling indicates that only a relatively small proportion of users (less than 25%) 
engage in “tumbling” and/or “wash trades” to obscure the user’s holdings. Thus, while techniques exist to 
help a bitcoin user conceal their activity, it appears that few bitcoin users adopt such techniques.  
The variable Darknet Shock Volume indicates that while most users do not trade in the period 
immediately following darknet shocks (median of zero), some users conduct a large fraction of their 
trading during these periods, with the average bitcoin user undertaking around 17% of their trading 
following darknet shocks. The variable Bitcoin Hype indicates that for the average user, the intensity of 
Google searches for “bitcoin” is around 28% of its maximum of 100%. The Pre-Silk-Road User dummy 
indicates that only around 7% of all bitcoin participants started transacting before October 2013, when the 
first darknet marketplace seizure by law enforcement agencies occurred (the seizure of Silk Road 1 by the 
FBI). The mean/median and maximum of Bitcoin Market Cap are close in value indicating that the 




4.4. How much illegal activity involves bitcoin? 
Both methods—network cluster analysis (SLM) and detection-controlled estimation (DCE)—
arrive at probabilistic classifications of bitcoin users into those primarily involved in legal activity and 
those primarily involved in illegal activity. Once the users have been partitioned into the legal and illegal 
“communities”, we use those categorizations to quantify the size and activity of the two groups. 
Table 4 presents the main results at the aggregate level, across the sample period. Panel A reports 
the estimated size of the groups and their level of activity, while Panel B re-expresses these values as 
percentages for each group. First, the percentage of bitcoin users estimated to be predominantly involved 
in illegal activity is 29.12% using the SLM and 23.23% using the DCE, giving a midpoint estimate of 
about one-quarter of bitcoin users (26.17%, the average of the estimates from the two models). The 99% 
confidence interval around this estimate is 20.13% to 32.21%.
24
 The midpoint estimate suggests around 
27.81 million bitcoin users are predominantly involved in illegal activity, versus 78.44 million legal users.  
The estimated number of illegal users is around four times larger than our sample of observed 
illegal users. Given our sample of observed illegal users is based on a comprehensive approach and 
includes all users that can be observed transacting with one of the known darknet marketplaces, the 
results suggest that without empirical methods such as the SLM or DCE, illegal activity that can be 
inferred from involvement with known darknet marketplaces represents only a small (and likely non-
random) fraction of all illegal activity. Thus, our results suggest that studies of known/identifiable darknet 
markets (e.g., Soska and Christin, 2015; Meiklejohn et al., 2013) only scratch the surface of all illegal 
activity involving bitcoin. 
 
< Table 4 > 
 
Table 4 also indicates that illegal users account for an even larger share of all transactions—
around 46.17% (45.67% using the SLM and 46.67% using the DCE) or approximately 280 million 
transactions. Thus, the average illegal user is involved in more transactions than the average legal user. 
This result is consistent with the notion that illegal users are likely to use bitcoin as a payment system 
(which involves actively transacting), whereas legal users may hold bitcoin for reasons such as 
speculation. A similar proportion is observed for holding values—illegal users on average hold around 
                                                          
24
 We use a form of bootstrapped standard errors to form the confidence interval. First we obtain standard errors 
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relative to the standard errors for the full sample size). We add to these standard errors the estimation uncertainty 
from the SLM model, which is captured by the users that cannot be uniquely assigned to the legal or illegal 




one-half (49.22%) of all outstanding bitcoins. One reason for the large share of illegal user holdings 
(relative to their share of the number of users) is related to the calculation of this variable as a time-series 
average. A high fraction of illegal users early in the sample (when there are fewer bitcoin users) can 
generate such a result even if the holdings per user are lower among illegal users compared to legal users. 
Illegal users are estimated to control around 39.31% of bitcoin addresses and account for about 
one-fifth (23.06%) of the dollar volume of bitcoin transactions. In dollar terms, illegal users conduct 
approximately $429 billion worth of bitcoin transactions. Because illegal users account for a larger share 
of transactions than their share of dollar volume, they tend to make smaller value transactions than legal 
users. This result is consistent with illegal users primarily using bitcoin as a payment system rather than 
holding it as an investment or speculative asset.  
 Three general conclusions can be drawn from the results in Table 4. First, illegal users account 
for a sizeable proportion of both users and trading activity in bitcoin, with the exact proportion varying 
across different measures of activity and the two estimation models. Second, the estimates from both the 
SLM and DCE are fairly similar across the various activity measures, despite relying on completely 
different assumptions and information. Third, even a fairly comprehensive approach to identifying illegal 
activity directly (such as the approach used in the previous section and that used in other darknet market 
studies) only captures a small fraction of the total illegal activity, highlighting the importance of 
extrapolation beyond a directly observed sample. 
 
4.5. How does the illegal activity vary through time? 
There is interesting time-series variation in the amount of illegal activity and its share of all 
bitcoin activity. Figures 4 to 7 plot the estimated amount of illegal activity that uses bitcoin through time 
from the first block in 2009 to 2017. The figures show the estimated number of illegal users, the number 
and dollar value of their transactions, and the value of their bitcoin holdings. Panel B of each of the 




< Figure 4 here > 
< Figure 5 here > 
< Figure 6 here > 
< Figure 7 here > 
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 Figures 4-7 use the average of the SLM and DCE model estimates. The SLM and DCE time-series estimates are 
separately reported in Figures A1-A8 of the Online Appendix.  
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A pattern that is observed across all activity measures is that illegal activity, as a percentage of 
total bitcoin activity, tends to be high at the start of the sample in 2009, and then again from 2011 to the 
beginning of 2016, after which it steadily declines through to 2017. The activity levels indicate that there 
is only a very small (negligible) level of activity in bitcoin until about the middle of 2011, so the activity 
at the start of the sample is not economically meaningful. In contrast, the high relative level of illegal 
activity between 2012 and 2016 is noteworthy and coincides with the growth in the number of illegal 
darknet marketplaces, starting with the Silk Road in 2011. After the Silk Road was shut down in October 
2013, a large number of other illegal darknet marketplaces commenced operating between 2013 and 2015 
(Table A1 of Appendix A). 
What could drive the decline in the relative level of illegal activity from beginning of 2016 
onwards? The first thing to note is that the decline is observed in relative terms (that is, illegal activity as 
a fraction of total bitcoin activity), but not in absolute terms. Thus, it is not the case that the level of 
illegal activity in bitcoin has declined in recent years; rather, there has been a disproportionate increase in 
the legal use of bitcoin since the beginning of 2016. For example, from the beginning of 2016 to April 
2017, the estimated number of illegal bitcoin users increases from around 21 million to around 27 million, 
reflecting growth of almost 30%, whereas the estimated number of legal bitcoin users increases from 
around 21 million to around 77 million, reflecting growth of around 250%. The rapid growth of legal use 
is likely driven by factors such as increased interest from investors and speculators (e.g., the emergence of 
“cryptofunds”, and more recently bitcoin futures) and increased mainstream adoption as a payment 
system (e.g., cafes and internet merchants accepting bitcoin).  
The emergence of new cryptocurrencies that are better at concealing a user’s activity might also 
have contributed to the decline in the share of illegal activity in bitcoin as criminals migrate to these more 
opaque alternatives. We shed some light on this issue by examining how the estimated illegal activity in 
bitcoin was impacted by one of the major darknet marketplaces, Alphabay, beginning to accept an opaque 
alternative cryptocurrency, Monero, on its platform from August 22, 2016. Given that Alphabay’s 
adoption of Monero is only expected to impact illegal activity, we isolate the impact using a difference-
in-differences model of illegal and legal transaction activity in bitcoin during the eight weeks either side 
of August 22, 2016. The results (reported in Table A3 of the Online Appendix) show a significant 
decrease in the illegal activity in bitcoin after the event. Illegal users are estimated to make around 90 
thousand fewer transactions in bitcoin per day after Alphabay’s adoption of Monero (relative to legal 
users). This is an economically meaningful change given that illegal users made around 217 thousand 
transactions per day before the change. Figure A9 of the Online Appendix illustrates that the change in 
illegal activity occurs quickly around Alphabay’s adoption of Monero. It also illustrates that the parallel 
trends assumption appears valid (further testing of this assumption could use a distributed lags approach). 
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While the effect of Alphabay’s adoption of Monero appears quite large, there are three further 
considerations when interpreting the effect size.  First, Alphabay is only one of many darknet sites, and it 
is likely other sites began accepting Monero at a similar time.  Second, it is possible that the transactions 
that migrate to Monero are smaller, leaving a proportionally larger dollar value of darknet activity in 
bitcoin.  Finally, it is possible that some of the darknet participants that initially switched to Monero 
returned to bitcoin some time later, potentially due to the continued widespread use of bitcoin in darknet 
marketplaces.   
The time-series of legal and illegal activity levels show strong growth in both illegal and legal 
activity throughout the sample period, in particular since 2012. Interestingly, the strong growth in illegal 
activity precedes the strong growth in legal activity—by about three or four years. Thus it seems illegal 
users were relatively early adopters of bitcoin as a payment system. Because of the rapid growth in the 
legal use of bitcoin in the final two years of the sample, the aggregate proportion of illegal bitcoin activity 
reported in the previous subsection understates the proportion that exists throughout most of the sample 
period. For example, for most of the period from 2009 to 2017, the estimated proportion of illegal users is 
closer to one-half than one-quarter (the aggregate estimate). The aggregate estimate is heavily influenced 
by the large number of legal users that enter in the last two years of the sample. Similarly, for much of the 
sample period, the estimated proportion of bitcoin transactions involved in illegal activity is between 60% 
and 80%, contrasting with the aggregate estimate of around 46%. 
The most recent estimates of illegal activity (at the end of our sample in April 2017) suggest there 
are around 27 million illegal users of bitcoin. These users conduct around 37 million bitcoin transactions 




4.6. What are the characteristics of illegal users? 
We assess the differences between legal and illegal user characteristics in two ways: univariate 
statistics that compare observed or estimated illegal users with their legal counterparts, and multivariate 
tests exploiting the coefficients of the estimated DCE model.  
 
< Table 5 > 
 
Starting with a univariate difference in means, Table 5 compares the characteristics of the sample 
of “observed” illegal users with the characteristics of other users. The “other users” are not all legal 
users—they contain a mix of legal users and undetected illegal users. Therefore, the table also compares 
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 For these estimates, we have halved the double-counted volumes so that the estimates can be interpreted as the 
volume/value of goods/services bought/sold by the illegal users. 
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the characteristics of users classified by the SLM and DCE models as being involved in illegal activity 
with those of the users classified as legal. Interestingly, despite being based on completely different 
assumptions, the SLM and DCE models generally agree on how the characteristics of legal users differ 
from illegal users. 
The SLM and DCE models agree that illegal users tend to transact more (have a two to three 
times higher Transaction Count), but use smaller sized transactions (about half the average size of legal 
transactions). This result could be a reflection of illegal users predominantly using bitcoin to buy and sell 
goods and services, whereas some legal users also use bitcoin for investment and speculation.
27
 With the 
average size of an illegal transaction being around $3,000, bitcoin transaction fees even at their peak of 
around $150 (see Basu et al., 2018) are small relative to the average illegal transaction. 
The models also agree that illegal users tend to hold less bitcoin (measured in dollar value) than 
legal users; their average Holding Value is about half that of legal users. This characteristic is consistent 
with the previous conjecture—legal users might tend to hold larger bitcoin balances because some use 
bitcoin for investment/speculation purposes, whereas for an illegal user that buys/sells illegal goods and 
services using bitcoin, holding a large balance is costly due to (i) opportunity costs of capital, and (ii) 
risks associated with having holdings seized by authorities. For these reasons, illegal users are likely to 
prefer holding less bitcoin and this tendency is supported by the data. 
Illegal users tend to have more counterparties in total, reflecting their larger number of 
transactions, but tend to have a higher counterparty concentration. This suggests that illegal users are 
more likely to repeatedly transact with a given counterparty. This characteristic might be a reflection of 
illegal users repeatedly transacting with a given illegal darknet marketplace or other illegal user once trust 
is established from a successful initial exchange. Illegal users have a longer Existence Time (time between 
their first and last transactions in bitcoin), consistent with our observations from the time-series that 
illegal users tend to become involved in bitcoin earlier than legal users. Similarly, the differences in 
means also show that there is a higher proportion of Pre-Silk-Road users among the illegal users than the 
legal users (as indicated by the variable Pre-Silk-Road User). 
The more specific indicators of illegal activity also show significant differences between the two 
groups. Illegal users tend to be more active during periods in which there are many illegal darknet 
marketplaces operating (a higher mean for the variable Darknet Sites). They make greater use of tumbling 
and wash trades to conceal their activity (two to three times more Tumbling). On average, a larger 
proportion of illegal volume, compared to legal volume, is transacted immediately following shocks to 
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darknet marketplaces (Darknet Shock Volume). This finding is consistent with anecdotal evidence that 
illegal users turn to alternative marketplaces in response to darknet marketplace seizures or scams. 
Interestingly, illegal users are more likely to transact in bitcoin when there is lower combined 
market value of “shadow coins” consistent with such coins serving as alternatives to bitcoin in illegal 
transactions. This result matches anecdotal accounts of shadow coins attracting attention from the illegal 
community for their increased privacy and recent examples of hackers demanding ransom payments in 
shadow coins rather than bitcoin. The result also supports the evidence that illegal activity in bitcoin 
decreased after a major darknet marketplace, Alphabay, adopted one of the major shadow coins, Monero, 
as a form of payment in August 2016.  
Another interesting result is that there tends to be relatively fewer illegal users when there is less 
Bitcoin Hype, measured by the Google search intensity for “bitcoin”. It therefore appears that Google 
searches for “bitcoin” are associated with mainstream (legal) adoption of bitcoin for payments, and/or 
speculative/investment interest in bitcoin. Similarly, there are relatively fewer illegal users when bitcoin 
market capitalization is higher and when other cryptocurrencies, “Alt-Coins” (excluding the opaque 
shadow coins), have higher value. This finding suggests that high valuations of bitcoin and other non-
shadow cryptocurrencies correspond to periods of increased legal interest in cryptocurrencies.   
In summary, the comparison of transactional characteristics (number and size of transactions, 
holdings, and counterparties) is consistent with the notion that illegal users predominantly use bitcoin for 
payments, whereas legal users are more likely to treat bitcoin as an investment asset. Furthermore, legal 
and illegal users differ with respect to when they are most active in bitcoin, with illegal users being most 
active when there are more darknet marketplaces, less bitcoin hype, lower bitcoin and other non-shadow 
cryptocurrency market capitalizations, and immediately following shocks to darknet marketplaces. The 
differences in characteristics for the instrumental variables are consistent with the hypothesized 
differences, lending support to their use as instruments. 
 
< Table 6 > 
 
 The DCE model coefficients reported in Table 6 provide multivariate tests of how the 
characteristics relate to the likelihood that a user is involved in illegal activity. The results confirm most 
of the observations made in the simple comparison of means. The effects of all of the instrumental 
variables are consistent with their hypothesized effects. A user is more likely to be involved in illegal 
activity if they trade when: (i) there are many darknet marketplaces in operation, (ii) “shadow coins” such 
as Monero are not widespread (low market values), (iii) the market value of bitcoin is low, and (iv) 
darknet marketplaces have recently experienced seizures or scams. A user is also more likely to be 
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involved in illegal activity if they use tumbling and/or wash trades, transact frequently in small sized 
transactions, and tend to repeatedly transact with a given counterparty. The value of other non-privacy 
cryptocurrencies (Alt Coins) at the time a user transacts is not statistically significant after controlling for 
the other variables, despite Alt Coins correlating with the likelihood of illegal activity in univariate tests. 
The results suggest that Bitcoin Market Cap is more closely related to the amount of mainstream and 
speculative interest in bitcoin and therefore Alt Coins is not a significant predictor of illegal activity after 
controlling for the value of bitcoin. 
 The marginal effects in Table 6, reported in parentheses below the coefficient estimates, provide a 
sense of the magnitudes of the effects and their relative importance.
28
 For example, the marginal effects 
indicate that a one standard deviation increase in the number of illegal darknet marketplaces at the time a 
user transacts in bitcoin increases the probability of that user being involved in illegal activity by a factor 
of 0.661, or 66.1% of what their probability would otherwise be.
29
 The magnitudes generally show that 
most of the determinants of involvement in illegal activity and determinants of the detection probability 
are economically meaningful. In particular, the instrumental variables Darknet Sites, Shadow Coins, 
Bitcoin Market Cap, and Darknet Shock Volume all have strong relations with the probability that a user 
is involved in illegal activity. 
 The DCE model also sheds light on the determinants of the likelihood that an illegal user is 
“detected” by either of our three approaches. The main instrument, Pre-Silk-Road User has a strong 
relation with detection, indicating that illegal users that commence transacting in bitcoin prior to the first 
darknet marketplace seizure in October 2013 have a higher probability of being detected. Similarly, those 
users that transact in bitcoin for a longer period of time (higher Existence Time), trade more frequently 
(higher Transaction Frequency), or tend to trade repeatedly with a given counterparty such as a darknet 
marketplace (higher Concentration), have a significantly higher detection probability. 
 Model 2 in Table 6 adds further control variables, including Holding Value and Transaction 
Count, and finds that the main results do not change much in response to additional control variables. A 
risk of adding too many transactional control variables is co-linearity between such variables. In 
unreported results, we also find that the main results are robust to including a measure of bitcoin 
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(Transaction Frequency, Size, and Count, and Holding Value) and winsorize the variables at +/- three standard 
deviations to reduce the influence of extreme values.  
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volatility. Somewhat unexpectedly, bitcoin volatility around the time a user transacts in bitcoin has a 
positive association with the likelihood that user is involved in illegal activity, all else equal.   
 
4.7. What are the characteristics of the illegal user network? 
Exploiting the fact that the bitcoin blockchain provides us with a complete record of every 
transaction between every pair of counterparties, we briefly explore how the trade network of illegal users 
differs from that of legal users. Our approach is to compute a few descriptive network metrics that capture 
different aspects of network topology and structure for each of the two groups or “communities” 
separately and then compare the values between the two communities. In mapping the networks, users 
form the “nodes”, and transactions between users form the “edges” or “links” between nodes.  
 
< Table 7 > 
 
Table 7 reports the results. The first metric, Density, takes the range [0,1] and indicates how 
highly connected the users are within a community (versus how sparse the connections are between 
users); it is the actual number of links between users within the given community (a “link” between two 
users means that they have transacted with one another) divided by the total potential number of links. It 
shows that the illegal trade network is three to four times denser in the sense that users are much more 
connected to one another through transactions. This observation is consistent with the fact that illegal 
users tend to transact more than legal users. It is also consistent with the notion that in the illegal 
community, bitcoin’s dominant role is likely that of a payment system in buying/selling goods, whereas in 
the legal community, bitcoin is also used as an investment or for speculation. 
Reciprocity takes the range [0,1] and indicates the tendency for users to engage in two-way 
interactions; it is the number of two-way links between users within the given community (a two-way link 
is when two users send and receive bitcoin to and from one another) divided by the total number of links 
within the given community (two-way and one-way). While Reciprocity is higher among illegal users 
than it is among legal users, it is generally very low in both communities (1% among legal users and 3% 
among illegal users). Thus, interactions between bitcoin users are generally only one-way interactions 
with one counterparty receiving bitcoin from the other but not vice versa.   
Entropy measures the amount of heterogeneity among users in their number of links to other 





 The results suggest that illegal users are a more heterogeneous group in terms of 
the number of links each user has with other members of the community. A driver of that heterogeneity 
could be that the illegal community at one end of the spectrum has darknet marketplaces that have 
hundreds of thousands of links to vendors and buyers, and at the other end has individual customers of a 
single marketplace, potential with only the one link. 
 A concluding observation is that both the SLM and DCE models provide a consistent picture of 
how legal and illegal users differ, this time in the context of their trade networks. Again, this suggests that 
the two different models tend to agree about the nature of the illegal activity in bitcoin. 
4.8. Robustness tests 
 We conduct a number of different robustness tests. Perhaps the most rigorous robustness test of 
an empirical model is to compare its results with results from a completely different model/approach that 
makes different assumptions and draws on different information. Throughout the paper we put our two 
empirical models through this test. The two models, one based on a network cluster analysis algorithm 
and the other on a structural latent variables model drawing on observable characteristics, provide highly 
consistent results. The two models tend to agree, within a reasonable margin of error, on the overall levels 
of illegal activity, as well as the differences between legal and illegal users in terms of characteristics and 
network structure. 
 We also subject each of the models to specific tests that vary key assumptions or modelling 
choices. Table 8 reports the estimated amount of illegal activity for the most notable of these tests. For the 
SLM, we re-estimate the model using transaction volumes as the measure of interaction between users 
rather than transaction counts (SLM Alternative 1). We also consider a modification of the SLM algorithm 
in which we impose a constraint that does not allow the sample of “observed” illegal users to be moved to 
the legal community (SLM Alternative 2).  
For the DCE model, one set of robustness tests involves examining the sensitivity to relaxing key 
exclusion restrictions. For example, in the baseline model, Darknet Sites (the number of operational 
darknet marketplaces at the time a user transacts) is included only as a determinant of illegal activity. As a 
robustness test (DCE Alternative 1), we include it in both equations, allowing it to also affect the 
probability of detection. Darknet Sites could affect detection if the existence of many darknet 
marketplaces is a catalyst for increased surveillance and enforcement by law enforcement authorities. We 
also test sensitivity to the key exclusion restriction in the detection equation by including Pre-Silk-Road 
User in both equations (DCE Alternative 2), thereby allowing it to also affect the probability of illegal 
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activity. Finally, we relax the restriction that tumbling does not impact the probability of detection (DCE 
Alternative 3).  
< Table 8 > 
 
Table 8 shows that the estimated overall levels of illegal activity across the various activity 
measures are not overly sensitive to modifications of the baseline model, although there is some variation 
in individual estimates of illegal activity. For example, across the various alternative model specifications, 
the estimated proportion of illegal users varies from a minimum of 22.29% to a maximum of 29.12%. 
Similarly, the estimated characteristics of illegal users are not overly sensitive to these modifications 
(results not reported for conciseness). The Online Appendix Table A1 reports the coefficient estimates of 
the three DCE models described above in which we relax key exclusion restrictions, showing that the key 
results are also not particularly sensitive to these modifications.  
We also examine the robustness of the DCE model to the initial parameter values used in 
estimating the model. We initialize the model with different starting values (-1, 0, +1, and randomly 
drawn starting values), and find that our results are not sensitive to the choice of starting values, 
suggesting convergence to a global rather than local maximum of the likelihood function. 
 We re-estimate the standard errors used in confidence bounds around the estimated illegal activity 
and significance tests. Instead of the bootstrapped standard errors that we use in the main results, we 
instead compute standard errors using analytic expressions. We find that the analytic standard errors are 
considerably smaller than the bootstrapped standard errors. This finding suggests that using bootstrapped 
standard errors in the main results is the more conservative of the two approaches. 
 Finally, the characteristics of illegal users could change through time (for example, in response to 
seizures by law enforcement agencies), which could lead to model mis-specification. To examine this 
possibility, we estimate difference-in-differences models of how illegal user characteristics change after 
the Silk Road seizure relative to the changes in legal user characteristics. Controlling for the changes in 
legal user characteristics removes potentially confounding time-series variation that is due to the 
evolution of the bitcoin ecosystem.  
Table A2 in the Online Appendix reports the difference-in-differences results using three 
different definitions of illegal users: illegal users identified by the SLM model, illegal users identified by 
the DCE model, and the directly observed sample of known illegal users that exist before and after the 
Silk Road seizure (corresponding to 2B and 2C in Table 3). The changes in most of the characteristics are 
not statistically distinguishable from zero. The statistically significant changes, using the directly 
observed illegal user group, suggest that after the Silk Road seizure illegal users tend to make fewer 
transactions, use smaller transactions, trade at a lower frequency, and hold smaller bitcoin balances. Such 
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changes could impact the DCE model estimates and given the direction of the changes they could bias 
against the DCE identifying users as illegal. However, all of the estimated changes are relative to legal 
users and therefore some of the differences might be driven by the increase in speculative and mainstream 
interest in bitcoin in the later years of the sample. Most of the estimated changes in characteristics are 
small relative to the overall means of the characteristics. Therefore, there do not appear to be major 
changes in illegal user characteristics following the Silk Road seizure. Simpler models of pre-post 
changes in the illegal user characteristics provide qualitatively similar results, also suggesting there are no 




5. Discussion  
5.1. Implications 
Blockchain technology and the systems/protocols that can be implemented on a blockchain have 
the potential to revolutionize numerous industries. Possible benefits to securities markets include reducing 
equities settlement times and costs (Malinova and Park, 2016; Khapko and Zoican, 2016), increasing 
ownership transparency leading to improved governance (Yermack, 2017), and providing a payments 
system with the network externality benefits of a monopoly but the cost discipline imposed by free market 
competition (Huberman et al., 2017). The technology has even broader applications beyond securities 
markets, from national land registries, to tracking the provenance of diamonds, decentralized decision 
making, peer-to-peer insurance, prediction markets, online voting, distributed cloud storage, internet 
domain name management, conveyancing, medical record management, and many more.  
This technology, however, is encountering considerable resistance, especially from regulators. 
Regulators are cautious due to their limited ability to regulate cryptocurrencies and the many potential but 
poorly understood risks associated with these innovations. The negative exposure generated by anecdotal 
accounts and salient examples of illegal activity no doubt contributes to regulatory concerns and risks 
stunting the adoption of blockchain technology, limiting its realized benefits. In quantifying and 
characterizing this area of concern, we hope to reduce the uncertainty about the negative consequences of 
cryptocurrencies, allowing for more informed decisions by policymakers that assess both the costs and 
benefits. Hopefully, by shedding light on the dark side of cryptocurrencies, this research will help 
blockchain technologies reach their full potential.  
A second contribution of this paper is the development of new approaches to identifying illegal 
activity in bitcoin, drawing on network cluster analysis and detection-controlled estimation techniques. 
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examine in more detail how user characteristics respond to seizures, or estimate models using only the observed 
illegal users that were not part of the Silk Road seizure. 
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These methods can be used by law enforcement authorities in surveillance activities. For example, our 
methods can be applied to blockchain data going forward as new blocks are created, allowing authorities 
to keep their finger on the pulse of illegal activity in bitcoin. Applied in this way, one could monitor 
trends in illegal activity such as its growth or decline, its response to various regulatory interventions such 
as seizures, and how its characteristics change through time. Such information could help make more 
effective use of scarce regulatory and enforcement resources.  
During our sample period, a number of opaque cryptocurrencies such as Monero, Dash, and 
ZCash, also known as “privacy coins”, emerged and gained some degree of adoption among illegal users. 
For example, some darknet marketplaces started accepting Monero for payments and our estimates 
suggest that such events negatively impacted the amount of illegal activity in bitcoin. While it is possible 
that further development of privacy coins could render our approach to detecting illegal activity less 
useful going forward, to date the major privacy coins have been shown to fall short of offering their users 
complete privacy. Using various heuristics and clustering algorithms, computer science researchers have 
been able to recreate user-level records and transaction activity in popular privacy coins such as Monero 
(Möser et al., 2018; Wijaya et al. 2018) and ZCash (Kappos et al., 2018). On the basis of such findings, 
privacy coins are perhaps not as private as they are intended to be. Therefore, even if illegal activity 
continues to migrate to popular privacy coins such as Monero and ZCash, law enforcement agencies and 
researchers could still use our approach applied across several cryptocurrencies, including privacy coins 
and non-privacy coins such as Bitcoin Cash, Litecoin, and Ethereum. It is possible that at some stage a 
truly private coin will be created for which it is not possible to undertake the type of analysis that is in this 
paper.  
Another surveillance application is in identifying individuals/entities of strategic importance, for 
example, major suppliers of illegal goods. Combining these empirical methods with other sources of 
information can “de-anonymize” the nameless entities identified in the data. This might be done, for 
example, by tracing the activity of particular individuals to the interface of bitcoin with either fiat 
currency or the regulated financial sector (many exchanges and brokers that convert cryptocurrencies to 
fiat currencies require the personal identification of clients). The methods that we develop can also be 
used in analyzing many other blockchains, though at present this might be more challenging for privacy 
coins. 
Third, our finding that a substantial amount of illegal activity is facilitated by bitcoin suggests 
that bitcoin has contributed to the emergence of an online black market, which raises several welfare 
considerations. Should policymakers be concerned that people are buying and selling illegal goods such 
as drugs online and using the anonymity of cryptocurrencies to make the payments? This is an important 
question and the answer is not obvious. If the online market for illegal goods and services merely reflects 
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a migration of activity that would have otherwise occurred “on the street” to the digital world of e-
commerce, the illegal online activity facilitated via bitcoin might not be bad from a welfare perspective. 
In fact, there are many potential benefits to having illegal drugs and other goods bought and sold online 
rather than on the street. For example, it might be safer and lead to reduced violence (e.g., Barratt et al., 
2016a). It could also increase the quality and safety of the drugs because darknet marketplaces rely 
heavily on user feedback and vendor online reputation, which can give a buyer access to more 
information about a seller’s track record and product quality than when buying drugs on the street (e.g., 
Soska and Christin, 2015). There is also more choice in the goods offered, which has the potential to 
increase consumer welfare.  
However, by making illegal goods more accessible, convenient, and reducing risk (due to 
anonymity), the darknet might encourage more consumption of illegal goods and increase reach, rather 
than simply migrating existing activity from the street to the online environment (Barratt et al., 2016b). 
Presuming illegal goods and services have negative net welfare consequences, then bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies could decrease welfare by enabling the online black market. Such negative 
consequences would have to be weighed up against welfare gains that also accompany cryptocurrencies.  
Therefore, while our paper does not provide a definitive answer to the question of welfare effects, 
it does get closer to an answer by having estimated both the trends and scale of illegal activity involving 
bitcoin (the most widely used cryptocurrency in darknet marketplaces). Future research might quantify 
the relation between drug trafficking on the street vs online (drawing on our methods or estimates) to 
understand to what extent we are experiencing a simple migration vs an expansion in the overall market. 
It might also quantify the benefits of moving to an online market and contrast them with the negative 
consequences of any expansion in the market as a result of it being more accessible / convenient / safe. 
Our results also have implications for the intrinsic value of bitcoin. The rapid increase in the price 
of bitcoin in recent times has prompted much debate and divided opinions among market participants and 
even policymakers / central banks about whether cryptocurrency valuations are disconnected from 
fundamentals and whether their prices reflect a bubble. In part, the debate reflects the uncertainty about 
how to value cryptocurrencies and how to estimate a fundamental or intrinsic value. While we do not 
propose a valuation model, our results provide an input to an assessment of fundamental value in the 
following sense. One of the intrinsic uses of cryptocurrencies, giving them some fundamental value, is as 
a payment system. To make payments with bitcoin, one has to hold some bitcoin; the more widespread its 
use as a payment system, the greater the aggregate demand for holding bitcoin to make payments, which, 
given the fixed supply, implies a higher price. Our results suggest that currently, as a payment system, 
bitcoin is relatively widely used to facilitate trade in illegal goods and services and thus the illegal use of 
bitcoin is likely to be a meaningful contributor to bitcoin’s fundamental value. 
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This observation—that a component of bitcoin’s fundamental value derives from its use in illegal 
trade—raises a few issues. First, an ethical investor might not be comfortable investing in a security for 
which a meaningful component of the fundamental value derives from illegal use. Second, changes in the 
demand to use bitcoin in illegal trade are likely to impact its fundamental value. For example, increased 
attention from law enforcement agencies or increased adoption/substitution to more opaque alternative 
cryptocurrencies could materially decrease the fundamental value of bitcoin. Conversely, continued 
growth in the online black market with continued use of bitcoin, could further increase bitcoin’s 
fundamental value. Third, the recent price appreciation of bitcoin greatly exceeds the growth in its use in 
illegal activity, suggesting either a substantial change in other components of bitcoin’s fundamental value 
or a dislocation of the bitcoin price from its fundamental value.    
 
5.2. Relation to other literature 
This paper contributes to three branches of literature. First, several recent papers analyze the 
economics of cryptocurrencies and applications of blockchain technology to securities markets (e.g., 
Malinova and Park, 2016; Khapko and Zoican, 2016; Yermack, 2017; Huberman et al., 2017; Basu et al., 
2018). Our paper contributes to this literature by showing that one of the major uses of cryptocurrencies 
as a payment system is in settings in which anonymity is valued (e.g., illegal trade). 
Another related, although small, branch of literature examines the degree of anonymity in bitcoin 
by quantifying the extent to which various algorithms can identify entities/users in bitcoin blockchain data 
and track their activity (e.g., Meiklejohn et al., 2013; Ron and Shamir, 2013; Androulaki et al., 2013; 
Tasca et al., 2018). In doing so, some of these papers also provide insights about the different types of 
activities that use bitcoin. Of these papers, one of the closest to ours is Meiklejohn et al. (2013), who 
explore the bitcoin blockchain up to April 2013, clustering addresses into entities/users and manually 
identifying some of those entities by physically transacting with them. They are able to identify the 
addresses of some miners, exchanges, gambling services, and vendors/marketplaces (including one 
darknet marketplace), suggesting bitcoin entities are not completely anonymous. Tasca et al. (2018) use a 
similar approach to explore the different types of activity in bitcoin, focusing only on the largest entities, 
so-called “super clusters”, and within that set, only those with a known identity. Fanusie and Robinson 
(2018) how a sample of known illegal entities, many of which are darknet marketplaces, exchange bitcoin 
for other currencies or “wash”/launder their bitcoin holdings. They find that among the known illegal 
entities that they consider, darknet marketplaces account for most of the bitcoin exchange/laundering and 
that bitcoins from these illegal entities are mainly exchanged/laundered through bitcoin exchanges, 
bitcoin mixers/tumblers, and gambling providers. 
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None of these papers attempt to categorize all of the activity in bitcoin, nor do they try and 
quantify or characterize the population of illegal bitcoin users, which is the focus of our paper. We exploit 
the lack of perfect anonymity that is documented in these studies and draw on some of the techniques 
from this literature to construct an initial sample of known illegal users. We add new methods to this 
literature, extending the empirical toolkit from making direct observations about individuals, to 
identification of communities and estimation of populations of users. 
Yin and Vatrapu (2017) compare the performance of various supervised machine learning 
algorithms in classifying a sample of bitcoin users. Their analysis uses a sample of known entities, which 
includes some darknet marketplaces and other illicit entities. The algorithms that perform the best within 
their sample give widely varying estimates of the proportion of illegal users in sample, from 10.95% to 
29.81%. While the study by Yin and Vatrapu focuses on the comparison of supervised machine learning 
algorithms, our study aims to provide comprehensive estimates of the scale and nature of illegal activity 
in bitcoin. Our paper therefore differs in that it analyzes all bitcoin activity, attempts to identify as much 




Finally, another related branch of literature is the recent studies of darknet marketplaces and the 
online drug trade, including papers from computer science and drug policy. For example, Soska and 
Christin (2015), use a web-crawler to scrape information from darknet marketplaces during 2013-2015, 
collecting a variety of data. Their paper provides valuable insights into these markets, including 
information about the types of goods and services traded (largely drugs), the number of goods listed, a 
lower bound on darknet turnover using posted feedback as a proxy (they do not have data on actual 
transactions/sales), the number of vendors, and the qualitative aspects of how these marketplaces operate 
(reputation, trust, feedback). The related drug policy studies often draw on other sources of information 
such as surveys of drug users and contribute insights such as: (i) darknet marketplaces like the Silk Road 
facilitate initiation into drug use or a return to drug use after cessation (Barratt et al., 2016b) and can 
encourage drug use through the provision of drug samples (Ladegaard, 2018); (ii) darknet forums can 
promote harm minimization by providing inexperienced users with support and knowledge from vendors 
and more experienced users (Bancroft, 2017); (iii) darknet marketplaces tend to reduce systemic violence 
compared with in-person drug trading because no face-to-face contact is required (Barratt et al., 2016a; 
Martin, 2018; Morselli et al., 2017); (iv) about one-quarter of the drugs traded on the Silk Road occur at a 
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 The results in Yin and Vatrapu (2017) are difficult to compare to ours for several reasons: their paper uses a non-
random sample of bitcoin activity, whereas we analyze all bitcoin activity, they do not specify how they filter the 
blockchain data, cluster addresses to form entities / users or how they identify a sample of known entities as all of 




wholesale scale, suggesting that such markets might also indirectly serve drug users “on the street” by 
impacting dealers (Aldridge and Décary-Hétu, 2016); and (v) there are interesting cross-country 
differences in the use of the darknet marketplace “Agora” (Van Buskirk et al., 2016).  
We contribute to this literature by quantifying the amount of illegal activity undertaken using 
bitcoin. All of the illegal activity captured by the existing studies of one or several darknet marketplaces 
is also in our measures because one of the approaches we use to construct a sample of observed illegal 
activity involves measuring transactions with known darknet marketplaces. However, our estimates 
include much more than this activity—we use direct measures of transactions rather than a lower-bound 
measure such as feedback, consider all known darknet marketplaces (rather than one or a few), include 
two other methods of obtaining a sample of illegal activity, and most importantly, we estimate models 
that extrapolate from the sample of observed illegal activity to the estimated population. This yields 
vastly different and more comprehensive estimates. Empirically, we confirm that studies of darknet 
marketplaces only scratch the surface of the illegal activity involving bitcoin—the estimated population 
of illegal activity is several times larger than what can be “observed” through studying known darknet 
marketplaces. Furthermore, the studies of darknet marketplaces do not analyze how the characteristics of 
illegal and legal bitcoin users differ, or how recent developments such as increased mainstream interest in 
bitcoin and the emergence of new, more opaque cryptocurrencies impacts the use of bitcoin in illegal 
activity. These are further contributions of our paper. 
 
6. Conclusion 
As an emerging FinTech innovation, cryptocurrencies and the blockchain technology on which 
they are based could revolutionize many aspects of the financial system, ranging from smart contracts to 
settlement, interbank transfers to venture capital funds, as well as applications beyond the financial 
system. Like many innovations, cryptocurrencies also have their dark side. We shed light on that dark 
side by quantifying and characterizing their use in illegal activity. 
We find that illegal activity accounts for a sizable proportion of the users and trading activity in 
bitcoin, as well as an economically meaningful amount in dollar terms. For example, approximately one-
quarter of all users and close to one-half of transactions are associated with illegal activity, equating to 
around 27 million market participants with illegal turnover of around $76 billion per year in recent times. 
Much of this illegal activity involves trading in darknet marketplaces. There are likely to be other forms 
of illegal activity such as evasion of capital controls that are not fully captured by our estimates.  
Illegal users of bitcoin tend to transact more, in smaller sized transactions, often repeatedly 
transacting with a given counterparty, and they tend hold less bitcoin. These features are consistent with 
their use of bitcoin as a payment system rather than for investment or speculation. Illegal users also make 
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greater use of transaction techniques that obscure their activity, and their activity spikes following shocks 
to darknet marketplaces. The proportion of bitcoin activity associated with illegal trade declines with 
increasing mainstream interest and hype (bitcoin market value and Google search intensity), the 
emergence of more opaque alternative cryptocurrencies, and with fewer operating darknet marketplaces. 
Our results have a number of implications. First, by shedding light on the dark side of 
cryptocurrencies, we hope this research will reduce some of the regulatory uncertainty about the negative 
consequences and risks of this innovation, thereby allowing more informed policy decisions that weigh up 
the benefits and costs. In turn, we hope this contributes to these technologies reaching their full potential. 
Second, the techniques developed in this paper can be used in cryptocurrency surveillance in a 
number of ways. The methods can be applied going forward as new blocks are added to the blockchain, 
allowing authorities to keep their finger on the pulse of illegal activity and monitor its trends, its 
responses to regulatory interventions, and how its characteristics change through time. Such information 
could help make more effective use of scarce regulatory and enforcement resources. The methods can 
also be used to identify individuals of strategic importance in illegal networks.  
Third, our paper suggests that a significant component of the intrinsic value of bitcoin as a 
payment system derives from its use in facilitating illegal trade. This has ethical implications for those 
that view bitcoin as an investment, as well as valuation implications. For example, changes in the demand 
to use bitcoin in illegal trade (e.g., due to law enforcement crackdowns or increased adoption of more 
opaque cryptocurrencies in illegal trade) are likely to impact its fundamental value.  
Finally, our paper moves the literature closer to answering the important question of the welfare 
consequences of the growth in illegal online trade. A crucial piece of this puzzle is understanding whether 
online illegal trade simply reflects migration of activity that would have otherwise occurred on the street, 
versus the alternative that by making illegal goods more accessible, convenient to buy, and less risky due 
to anonymity, the move online encourages growth in the aggregate black market. Our estimates of the 
amount of illegal trade facilitated via bitcoin through time contribute to understanding this issue, but 




Appendix A: Darknet sites and bitcoin seizures 
 
Table A1: Darknet sites accepting bitcoin, current and past 
This table reports the 30 known darknet marketplaces with the longest operational history. For sites that remain 
operational (as at May 2017), the End date column states “Operational” and thus there is no Closure reason. Days 









Dream November 15, 2013 Operational 
 
>1,207 
Outlaw December 29, 2013 May 16, 2017 Hacked 1234 
Silk Road 1 January 31, 2011 October 2, 2013 Raided 975 
Black Market Reloaded June 30, 2011 December 2, 2013 Hacked 886 
AlphaBay December 22, 2014 July 4, 2017 Raided 925 
Tochka January 30, 2015 Operational  >766 
Crypto Market / Diabolus February 14, 2015 Operational  >751 
Real Deal April 9, 2015 Operational  >697 
Darknet Heroes May 27, 2015 Operational  >649 
Agora December 3, 2013 September 6, 2015 Voluntary 642 
Nucleus October 24, 2014 April 13, 2016 Scam 537 
Middle Earth  June 22, 2014 November 4, 2015 Scam 500 
BlackBank February 5, 2014 May 18, 2015 Scam 467 
Evolution January 14, 2014 March 14, 2015 Scam 424 
Silk Road Reloaded January 13, 2015 February 27, 2016 Unknown 410 
Anarchia May 7, 2015 May 9, 2016 Unknown 368 
Silk Road 2 November 6, 2013 November 5, 2014 Raided 364 
The Marketplace November 28, 2013 November 9, 2014 Voluntary 346 
Blue Sky Market December 3, 2013 November 5, 2014 Raided 337 
Abraxas December 13, 2014 November 5, 2015 Scam 327 
Pandora October 21, 2013 August 19, 2014 Scam 302 
BuyItNow April 30, 2013 February 17, 2014 Voluntary 293 
TorBazaar January 26, 2014 November 5, 2014 Raided 283 
Sheep February 28, 2013 November 29, 2013 Scam 274 
Cloud-Nine February 11, 2014 November 5, 2014 Raided 267 
Pirate Market November 29, 2013 August 15, 2014 Scam 259 
East India Company April 28, 2015 January 1, 2016 Scam 248 
Mr Nice Guy 2 February 21, 2015 October 14, 2015 Scam 235 
Andromeda April 5, 2014 November 18, 2014 Scam 227 





Table A2: Bitcoin seizures 
This table reports major bitcoin seizures, the seizing authority, the owner of the seized bitcoin, the date of the 
seizure, and the amount (in bitcoin) seized.  
 
Seizing authority Seized entity Owner of seized bitcoins Date of seizure Bitcoin seized 
Australian Government Individual Richard Pollard December 1, 2012 24,518 
US government Individual Matthew Luke Gillum July 23, 2013 1,294 
ICE and HSI Individual Cornelius Jan Slomp August 27, 2013 385,000 
FBI Individual Ross William Ulbircht October 1, 2013 144,000 
FBI Site Silk Road escrow 
accounts (many users) 




Appendix B: Derivations for the DCE model 
 
We define 𝐼( . ) and 𝐷(. ) to be monotonic link functions that map 𝑥1𝑖𝛽1 and 𝑥2𝑖𝛽2 to latent 
probabilities of a bitcoin user being involved predominantly in illegal activity, and detection of an illegal 
user, respectively.
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  That is,     
𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1) = Pr (𝐿1𝑖 = 1)      (B.1) 
𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2) = Pr(𝐿2𝑖 = 1 | 𝐿1𝑖 = 1)     (B.2) 
Table B1 reports the probabilities of various joint outcomes (represented by cells in the table). The 
joint outcomes are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, so the probabilities in Table B1 sum to one.  
 
Table B1: Two-stage DCE model probability matrix 
 Illegal user Legal user 
Detected 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)  0  
Not detected 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)[1 − 𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)]  1 − 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)  
 
The log likelihood of the users that end up in the detected (seized) illegal users category (𝐴) is the log of 
the sum (over users in 𝐴) of the probabilities of that joint outcome:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝐴 = ∑ log [𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)]𝑖𝜖𝐴       (B.3) 
Similarly, the log likelihood of the users that end up in the other category (𝐴𝐶) is the log of the sum (over 
users in 𝐴𝐶) of the probabilities of that joint outcome (the probability that the user is a legal one plus the 
probability that an illegal user is not detected): 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝐴𝐶 = ∑ log [𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)[1 − 𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)] + 1 − 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝑖𝜖𝐴𝐶 ]    (B.4) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿𝐴𝐶 = ∑ log [1 − 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)𝑖𝜖𝐴𝐶 ]       (B.5) 
Sets 𝐴 and 𝐴𝐶 constitute the universe of all bitcoin users. Therefore the full-sample log likelihood is: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿 = ∑ log [𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)]𝑖𝜖𝐴 + ∑ log [1 − 𝐼(𝑥1𝑖𝛽1)𝐷(𝑥2𝑖𝛽2)]𝑖𝜖𝐴𝑐     (B.6) 
Maximum likelihood estimation involves selecting parameter vectors 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 such that the function 
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This table defines the variables that we compute for each bitcoin user. The third column, DCE equation, specifies whether the 
variable is used in the first equation of the DCE model (the equation modelling whether the user is involved in illegal activity, 
I), the second equation of the DCE model (the equation modelling whether a user that is involved in illegal activity is 







The total number of bitcoin transactions involving the given user (where the user is a sender 
and/or recipient of bitcoin). 
 
C 
Transaction Size Average USD value of the user’s transactions. The transaction size is converted from bitcoin 
to USD using end of day USD/BTC conversion rates. Exchange rates prior to July 18, 2010 
are not available and therefore values before this date are converted at the July 18, 2010 
exchange rate. 
 
I & D 
Transaction 
Frequency 
The number of bitcoin transactions made by the user per month. This is computed as 
Transaction Count divided by Existence Time. 
 
I & D 
Counterparties The total number of other users with which the given user has transacted. 
 
C 
Holding Value The average USD value of the user’s bitcoin holdings. The average is computed from the 
holding balances recorded at the end of each of the user’s bitcoin transactions. Holding values 
are converted from bitcoin to USD using end of day USD/BTC conversion rates. Exchange 
rates prior to July 18, 2010 are not available and therefore values before this date are 
converted at the July 18, 2010 exchange rate. 
 
C 
Concentration Concentration is a measure of the tendency for a user to transact with one or many 
counterparties. It ranges from 1 for a highly concentrated user who transacts with only one 
counterparty, to 0 for a user that has many transactions, each with a different counterparty. 



















]         if       𝑇 > 1
1                                         if       𝑇 = 1
 
where 𝑇 is Transaction Count and 𝐶 is Counterparties (the total number of other users with 
which the given user has transacted). 
 
I & D 
Existence Time 
 
Number of months the bitcoin user is active in the bitcoin network. Measured as the number 
of months from the user’s first transaction until the user’s last observed transaction, if that 
transaction results in the user having a bitcoin balance of zero. If the user’s last transaction 
results in a bitcoin balance above zero, the user is regarded as active until the end of our 
sample in April 2017. 
 
I & D 
Darknet Sites A transaction-weighted average of the number of operational illegal darknet marketplaces at 
the time a user transacts (the sum of number of operational darknet marketplaces at every 
transaction, divided by Transaction Count). The logic is that if a user transacts at a time when 
there is a lot of illegal darknet marketplace activity, they are more likely to be involved in 
illegal activity than if they are active when there is little or no illegal darknet activity. 
 







Tumbling  Tumbling refers to techniques or services used to obscure a user’s holdings or transaction 
history. Wash transactions, in which a user is both the sender and receiver of bitcoin, are also 
sometimes used for such purpose. Illegal users are likely to have greater incentives to obscure 
their activity than legal users. We classify tumbling transactions using the following three 
approaches. Approach 1: transactions with known tumbling service providers (such as Coin 
Fog). Approach 2: transactions in which a user sends bitcoin to another user (potential 
tumbler) and that user sends the bitcoin back (in one or several transactions), less a tumbling 
fee of between 0 to 10 % within 10 blocks. Approach 3: transactions with users that display 
the characteristics of tumbling service providers (a Transaction Count of 10 or above and 
displays the two tumbling characteristics above in at least 8% of transactions). For each user, 






The percentage of the user’s transaction value that occurs immediately after shocks to darknet 
marketplaces, including one week after each seizure or “exit scam” of a darknet marketplace. 
Seizures by law enforcement officials and “exit scams” in which darknet sites close without 
warning are likely to result in increased activity from illegal users as they turn to alternative 
marketplaces or relocate their holdings. At the same time, shocks to darknet marketplaces are 
unlikely to materially affect the activity of legal users.  
 
I 
Bitcoin Hype The transaction-weighted average of the Google Trends value for “bitcoin” (calculated from 
Jan 1, 2009 to May 1, 2017). For each user, we record the intensity of Google searches for the 
term “bitcoin” (scaled from 0-100) in the months of their transactions and then compute the 
average for each user across all of their transactions. The logic is that the more intensive the 
search activity for bitcoin on Google is, the more likely the user is transacting for speculative 





The transaction-weighted average log market capitalization of bitcoin at the time of each 
user’s transactions. For each user, we calculate the log market capitalization of bitcoin at the 
time of each user’s transactions. We then compute the average across all of the user’s 
transactions. The logic is that as the value of bitcoin increases, the likelihood of illegal 
activity is lower as more speculators are present.  
 
I 
Shadow Coins  The transaction-weighted average log market capitalization of major opaque cryptocurrencies 
(“shadow coins”: Dash, Monero, and ZCash) at the time of each user’s transactions. The logic 
is that if illegal users make use of shadow coins, the likelihood of illegal activity in bitcoin 
will be lower when shadow coins are more prevalent.  
 
I 
Alt Coins The transaction-weighted average log market capitalization of other non-privacy coins (“alt-
coins”: all cryptocurrencies excluding bitcoin and “shadow coins”) at the time of each user’s 
transactions. The logic is that when there is a lot of interest in alternative non-privacy 
cryptocurrencies, which cannot be used in darknet markets, all else equal, it is likely there is 
proportionally more legal/speculative trade in cryptocurrencies and thus a lower fraction of 





Dummy variable that is equal to one if the user commenced transacting in bitcoin prior to the 
seizure of Silk Road 1 on October 1, 2013. The logic is that an illegal user that was using 
bitcoin prior to the first major darknet seizure by law enforcement authorities has a higher 
probability of having been detected than a user that started transacting in bitcoin after that 







Descriptive statistics for all users 
This table reports descriptive statistics about bitcoin users. Transaction Count is the total number of bitcoin 
transactions involving a given user. Transaction Size (in USD) is the user’s average transaction value. Transaction 
Frequency is the average rate at which the user transacts between their first and last transactions, annualized to 
transactions per year. Counterparties is the total number of other users with which the given user has transacted.  
Holding Value is the average value of the user’s bitcoin holdings (in USD), where holdings are measured after each 
transaction. Concentration takes values between zero and one, with higher values indicating a tendency to 
repeatedly trade with a smaller number of counterparties. Existence Time is the number of months between the date 
of the user’s first and last transaction. Darknet Sites is the average number of operational darknet sites at the time of 
each of the user’s transactions. Tumbling is the percentage of the user’s transactions that attempt to obscure the 
user’s holdings (wash or tumbling trades). Darknet Shock Volume is the percentage of the user’s total dollar volume 
that is transacted during the week after marketplace seizures or “exit scams”. Bitcoin Hype is a measure of the 
intensity of Google searches for the term “bitcoin” around the time of the user’s trades. Pre-Silk-Road User is a 
dummy variable taking the value one if the user’s first bitcoin transaction is before the seizure of the Silk Road on 
October 2013. Bitcoin Market Cap, Shadow Coins, and Alt Coins are transaction-weighted average log market 
capitalizations of bitcoin, major opaque cryptocurrencies, and non-privacy cryptocurrencies excluding bitcoin, 
respectively, at the time of each user’s transactions. 
 
Variable Mean StdDev Min P25 Median P75 Max 
Panel A: Transactional characteristics 
Transaction Count 5.70 1,622.74 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 11,410,691.00 
Transaction Size 5,207.61 56,939.00 1.00 22.06 111.91 668.44 92,504,688.00 
Transaction Frequency 29.88 659.27 0.12 7.20 24.00 36.00 3,077,978.00 
Counterparties 4.18 553.71 0.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 4,385,500.00 
Holding Value 3,974.05 55,011.00 0.00 15.91 83.96 551.37 115,529,839.00 
Concentration 0.10 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Existence Time 6.61 11.91 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00 101.00 
Panel B: Characteristics associated with particular types of activity 
Darknet Sites 17.14 5.10 0.00 15.00 18.00 20.00 27.00 
Tumbling 0.45 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 181.82 
Darknet Shock Volume 16.51 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 
Bitcoin Hype 28.29 15.44 0.00 19.00 24.00 38.00 100.00 
Pre-Silk-Road User 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Bitcoin Market Cap  9.82 0.49 5.14 9.71 9.94 10.09 10.40 
Shadow Coins 7.07 2.52 0.00 7.28 7.78 8.32 9.10 





Size and activity of observed user groups 
This table reports the size and activity of (1) all users, (2) observed illegal users, and (3) other users. The observed 
illegal user group has three subgroups: users that had bitcoin seized by law enforcement agencies (“Seized Users”), 
illegal darknet marketplace escrow accounts (hot wallets), users that have interacted (sent or received bitcoin) with 
those accounts (“Black Market Users”), and users whose bitcoin address(es) are mentioned in darknet forums 
(“Forum Users”). The measures of group size and activity are: the number of users (Users), the number of 
transactions (Transaction Count), the average dollar value of monthly bitcoin holdings (Holding Value), the number 
of bitcoin addresses (Number Of Addresses), and the dollar volume of transactions (Volume). The percentage of total 
users/activity is reported in parentheses below each value. 
 









1. All Users 106,244,432 605.69 2,964.66 221.71 1,862.51 
 (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) 
2. Observed Illegal Users 6,223,359 196.11 1,342.43 58.38 241.46 
 (5.86%) (32.38%) (45.28%) (26.33%) (12.96%) 
2A. Seized Users 1,041 23.83 9.39 8.30 17.51 
 (0.00%) (3.93%) (0.32%) (3.74%) (0.94%) 
2B. Black Market Users  
        (not in 2A) 
6,221,870 157.30 1,324.32 49.71 220.91 
(5.86%) (25.97%) (44.67%) (22.42%) (11.86%) 
2C. Forum Users  
       (not in 2A or 2B) 
448 14.98 8.72 0.38 3.03 
(0.00%) (2.47%) (0.29%) (0.17%) (0.16%) 
3. Other Users 100,021,073 409.58 1,622.23 163.33 1,621.05 






Estimated size and activity of legal and illegal user groups 
This table reports the size and activity of legal and illegal user groups. The measures of group size and activity are: 
the number of users (Users), the number of transactions (Transaction Count), the average dollar value of bitcoin 
holdings (Holding Value), the number of bitcoin addresses (Number Of Addresses), and the dollar volume of 
transactions (Volume). Panel A reports the values of these measures for the two user groups, while Panel B 
expresses the measures for each group as a percentage of the total. Different rows report different approaches to 
classifying the legal and illegal user groups. SLM provides estimates from the network cluster analysis approach to 
classification (a variant of the “Smart Local Moving” algorithm). DCE provides estimates from the detection-
controlled estimation (DCE) approach to classification, which exploits the characteristics of legal and illegal users. 
Midpoint is the average of the estimates from the SLM and DCE models. Upper bound and Lower bound provide a 
99% confidence interval around the Midpoint, using a form of bootstrapped standard errors.  
 










Panel A: Values 
Illegal SLM 30.94 276.63 1,394.76 87.95 436.78 
 DCE 24.68 282.70 1,523.87 86.35 422.05 
 Upper bound 34.22 308.72 1,782.44 99.67 558.23 
 Midpoint 27.81 279.67 1,459.32 87.15 429.41 
 Lower bound 21.39 250.62 1,136.20 74.63 300.60 
Legal SLM 75.31 329.06 1,569.90 133.76 1,425.73 
 DCE 81.57 322.99 1,440.79 135.37 1,440.45 
 Upper bound 84.86 355.07 1,828.47 147.09 1,561.91 
 Midpoint 78.44 326.02 1,505.35 134.56 1,433.09 
 Lower bound 72.02 296.97 1,182.22 122.04 1,304.28 
Panel B: Percentages 
Illegal SLM 29.12% 45.67% 47.05% 39.67% 23.45% 
 DCE 23.23% 46.67% 51.40% 38.95% 22.66% 
 Upper bound 32.21% 50.97% 60.12% 44.96% 29.97% 
 Midpoint 26.17% 46.17% 49.22% 39.31% 23.06% 
 Lower bound 20.13% 41.38% 38.32% 33.66% 16.14% 
Legal SLM 70.88% 54.33% 52.95% 60.33% 76.55% 
 DCE 76.77% 53.33% 48.60% 61.05% 77.34% 
 Upper bound 79.87% 58.62% 61.68% 66.34% 83.86% 
 Midpoint 73.83% 53.83% 50.78% 60.69% 76.94% 




Differences in characteristics between illegal and legal users 
This table reports differences in mean characteristics for illegal vs legal bitcoin users. The first three columns (“Observed”) compare observed illegal users (those 
identified through seizures, darknet marketplaces, and darknet forums) and other users (including both legal and undetected illegal users). The second three 
columns (“SLM”) compare illegal and legal users, classified by a network cluster analysis algorithm (SLM). The final three columns (“DCE”) compare illegal 
and legal users, classified by a detection-controlled estimation (DCE) model. The characteristics are as follows. Transaction Count is the total number of bitcoin 
transactions involving the given user. Transaction Size (in USD) is the user’s average transaction value. Transaction Frequency is the average rate at which the 
user transacts between their first and last transactions, annualized to transactions per year. Counterparties is the total number of other users with which the given 
user has transacted. Holding Value is the average value of the user’s bitcoin holdings (in USD), where holdings are measured after each transaction. 
Concentration takes values between zero and one, with higher values indicating a tendency to repeatedly trade with a smaller number of counterparties. Existence 
Time is the number of months between the date of the user’s first and last transaction. Darknet Sites is the average number of operational darknet sites at the time 
of each of the user’s transactions. Tumbling is the percentage of the user’s transactions that attempt to obscure the user’s holdings (wash or tumbling trades). 
Darknet Shock Volume is the percentage of the user’s total dollar volume that is transacted during the week after marketplace seizures or “exit scams”. Bitcoin 
Hype is a measure of the intensity of Google searches for the term “bitcoin” around the time of the user’s trades. Pre-Silk-Road User is a dummy variable taking 
the value one if the user’s first bitcoin transaction is before the seizure of the Silk Road on October 2013. Bitcoin Market Cap, Shadow Coins, and Alt Coins are 
transaction-weighted average log market capitalizations of bitcoin, major opaque cryptocurrencies, and non-privacy cryptocurrencies excluding bitcoin, 
respectively, at the time of each user’s transactions. The significance of the difference in means is computed with t-tests. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.  
 




















Transaction Count 4.09 31.51 27.42***  4.37 8.94 4.57***  3.96 11.46 7.50*** 
Transaction Size 5,346.87 2,969.38 -2,377.49***  6,225.51 2,729.66 -3,495.85***  5,791.25 3,278.30 -2,512.95*** 
Transaction Frequency 28.91 45.46 16.54***  29.77 30.16 0.39**  28.50 34.45 5.95*** 
Counterparties 3.53 14.61 11.08***  3.77 5.18 1.42***  3.57 6.19 2.62*** 
Holding Value 4,021.77 3,207.06 -814.71***  4,625.45 2,388.31 -2,237.14***  4,359.86 2,698.71 -1,661.16*** 
Concentration 0.09 0.20 0.11***  0.08 0.13 0.05***  0.09 0.12 0.04*** 
Existence Time 6.19 13.44 7.26***  5.91 8.31 2.40***  6.17 8.08 1.91*** 
Darknet Sites 17.17 16.67 -0.50***  17.13 17.17 0.04***  16.87 18.04 1.18*** 
Tumbling 0.40 1.18 0.78***  0.37 0.64 0.27***  0.31 0.89 0.58*** 
Darknet Shock Volume 15.84 27.25 11.40***  14.51 21.39 6.88***  10.57 36.14 25.56*** 
Bitcoin Hype 28.74 21.16 -7.58***  29.67 24.95 -4.72***  30.99 19.38 -11.60*** 
Pre-Silk-Road User 0.06 0.22 0.16***  0.06 0.12 0.07***  0.03 0.22 0.19*** 
Bitcoin Market Cap 9.85 9.45 -0.40***  9.88 9.68 -0.21***  9.96 9.36 -0.60*** 
Shadow Coins 7.18  5.34  -1.84***  7.30  6.51  -0.79***  7.67  5.11  -2.56*** 




DCE model estimates 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and marginal effects of two detection-controlled estimation (DCE) 
models. Both models use the two-equation structure given by equations (1-4) of the paper. Model 1 is the baseline 
model used for the main results in the paper. Model 2 includes additional control variables. I() is the probability that 
a given user is predominantly using bitcoin for illegal activity. D() is the conditional probability of detection. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. Numbers not in brackets are the coefficient estimates. Numbers in brackets are the 
marginal effects (partial derivatives of the corresponding probability with respect to each of the variables, reported 
as a fraction of the estimated corresponding probability). Pseudo 𝑅2 is McFadden’s likelihood ratio index (one 
minus the ratio of the log-likelihood with all predictors and the log-likelihood with intercepts only). Significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively, using bootstrapped standard errors.  
 
 Model 1  Model 2 
Variable I() D()   I() D() 




















































Darknet Shock Volume 0.445***   0.496***  
 
(0.293)   (0.319)  
Pre-Silk-Road User  0.430***   0.430** 
 
 (0.204)   (0.213) 
Transaction Frequency 0.438*** 0.477***  0.230 0.474 
 
(0.288) (0.227)  (0.148) (0.235) 
Transaction Size 0.005 -0.171***  -1.574*** -0.443** 
 
(0.003) (-0.081)  (-1.011) (-0.220) 
Concentration 0.293*** 0.542***  0.268*** 0.500*** 
 
(0.193) (0.258)  (0.172) (0.248) 








   
3.602*** -0.537 
    (2.312) (-0.266) 
Transaction Count 
   
7.900 -0.593 
    (5.071) (-0.294) 
      
      







Network characteristics of legal and illegal bitcoin user networks 
This table reports metrics that characterize the trade networks of estimated legal and illegal bitcoin users. In the 
columns labelled “SLM” user classifications into legal and illegal communities are based on a network cluster 
analysis algorithm (SLM) and in the columns labelled “DCE” the classifications are from a detection-controlled 
estimation (DCE) model. Density takes the range [0,1] and indicates how highly connected the users are within a 
community (versus how sparse the connections are between users); it is the actual number of links between users 
within the given community (a “link” between two users means that they have transacted with one another) divided 
by the total potential number of links. Reciprocity takes the range [0,1] and indicates the tendency for users to 
engage in two-way interactions (both sending and receiving bitcoin to and from one another); it is the number of 
two-way links between users within the given community divided by the total number of links within the given 
community (two-way and one-way). Entropy measures the amount of heterogeneity among users in their number of 
links. It takes its minimum value of zero when all users have the same number of links (same degree). 
 
Metric SLM DCE 
 Legal Illegal Legal Illegal 
Density (10
-6
) 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.17 
Reciprocity 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 





This table reports robustness tests for the sensitivity of the overall estimated amount of illegal activity in bitcoin to 
variations in the specification of the underlying empirical models. The rows reflect estimates from different models. 
SLM Baseline and DCE Baseline are the SLM and DCE models used to produce the main results, and are included 
for comparison. The models labelled “Alternative” are variations on the corresponding baseline model. SLM 
Alternative 1 is an SLM model that considers the transaction volume (in bitcoins) rather than the transaction count 
as a measure of trading activity when applying the network cluster analysis algorithm. SLM Alternative 2 is a 
variation of the baseline SLM model in which observed (known) illegal users are constrained from leaving the 
illegal community. DCE Alternative 1, 2, and 3 are variations of the baseline DCE model in which exclusion 
restrictions for the instrumental variables are relaxed one at a time (these models correspond to Models 1-3 of Table 
A1 in the Online Appendix) respectively.  The measures of group size and activity are: the number of users (Users), 
the number of transactions (Transaction Count), the average dollar value of bitcoin holdings (Holding Value), the 
number of bitcoin addresses (Number Of Addresses), and the dollar volume of transactions (Volume). Panel A 
reports the values of these measures for the two user groups, while Panel B expresses the measures for each group as 

















Panel A: Values 
Illegal SLM Baseline 30.94 276.63 1,394.76 87.95 436.78 
 SLM Alternative 1 28.95 270.69 1,418.42 85.10 400.29 
 SLM Alternative 2 23.68 287.42 1,866.47 89.23 441.94 
 DCE Baseline 24.68 282.70 1,523.87 86.35 422.05 
 DCE Alternative 1 27.12 317.69 2,349.53 98.51 479.13 
 DCE Alternative 2 24.59 276.56 1,474.28 82.47 420.22 
 DCE Alternative 3 25.73 284.45 1,444.59 87.52 414.52 
Panel B: Percentages 
Illegal SLM Baseline 29.12% 45.67% 47.05% 39.67% 23.45% 
 SLM Alternative 1 27.25% 44.69% 47.84% 38.38% 21.49% 
 SLM Alternative 2 22.29% 47.45% 62.96% 40.25% 23.73% 
 DCE Baseline 23.23% 46.67% 51.40% 38.95% 22.66% 
 DCE Alternative 1 25.53% 52.45% 79.25% 44.43% 25.72% 
 DCE Alternative 2 23.14% 45.66% 49.73% 37.20% 22.56% 




Panel A: Example of illegal drugs that can be purchased with bitcoin on the Silk Road marketplace 
 
 
Panel B: Example of information on individual items and sellers on the Silk Road marketplace 
    
 




Screenshots from one of the first illegal darknet marketplaces, Silk Road 1 
Panel A provides an example of the “Drugs” page from Silk Road. It illustrates the wide variety of illegal goods that 
can be purchased using bitcoin, including a vast array of illegal drugs, weapons, and forgeries. Panel B provides an 
example of information about individual items and sellers. Clicking on the appropriate headings, one can obtain 
further information about the item for sale (detailed product description, insurance/refunds, postage methods and 
locations, security and encryption, etc.) and about the seller (detailed feedback and ratings from buyers, history of 
sales, etc.). Panel C shows the interface for depositing bitcoin to Silk Road’s escrow account, transferring bitcoins to a 




Panel A: Percentage of users 
 
Panel B: Percentage of transactions 
 
Panel C: Percentage of dollar volume 
 
Panel D: Percentage of bitcoin holdings 
 
Figure 2 
Size and activity of the sample of “observed” illegal bitcoin users 
This figure illustrates the time-series of the three subgroups of observed illegal users as a percentage of total users 
(Panel A), their number of transactions as a percentage of all transaction (Panel B), the dollar value of their 
transactions as a percentage of the dollar value of all transactions (Panel C), and the dollar value of their bitcoin 
holdings as a percentage of the dollar value of all bitcoin holdings (Panel D). The observed illegal user group 
includes three subgroups: users that had bitcoin seized by law enforcement agencies (“Seized Users”), illegal 
darknet marketplace escrow accounts (hot wallets), and users that have sent or received bitcoin from those accounts 
(“Black Market Users”), and users whose bitcoin address(es) are mentioned in darknet forums (“Forum Users”). 
“Other Users” corresponds to all bitcoin users other than those in the sample of observed illegal users. The values 
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Two-stage detection-controlled estimation (DCE) model 
The figure illustrates the structure of the two-stage DCE model. Stage 1 models how legal and illegal users of 
bitcoin differ in characteristics. Stage 2 models the determinants of the probability that an illegal user was 
“detected” (had bitcoin seized by a law enforcement agency, was identified in darknet forums, or was observed in 
the blockchain data as having transacted with a known illegal darknet marketplace). Both stages are estimated 
simultaneously using maximum likelihood to select parameter values that maximize the likelihood of the observable 




Panel A: Estimated number of illegal and legal bitcoin users  
  
Panel B: Estimated percentage of illegal bitcoin users with 99% confidence bounds 
  
Figure 4 
Estimated number and percentage of bitcoin users involved in illegal activity 
This figure illustrates the time-series of the estimated number of illegal and legal bitcoin users (Panel A) and the 
percentage of illegal users (Panel B). In Panel A, the number of legal users is plotted with the solid line using the 
left-hand-side axis and the number of illegal users is plotted with the dashed line using the right-hand-side axis. In 
Panel B, the solid line is the point estimate of the percentage of illegal users and the dashed lines provide a 99% 
confidence interval using bootstrapped standard errors. The estimates come from a combination of two empirical 
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Panel A: Estimated number of illegal and legal bitcoin user transactions per month 
  
Panel B: Estimated percentage illegal user transactions with 99% confidence bounds 
   
Figure 5 
Estimated number and percentage of illegal bitcoin users transactions 
This figure illustrates the time-series of the estimated number of illegal and legal bitcoin user transactions per month 
(Panel A) and the percentage of illegal user transactions (Panel B). In Panel A, the number of legal user transactions 
is plotted with the solid line using the left-hand-side axis and the number of illegal user transactions is plotted with 
the dashed line using the right-hand-side axis. In Panel B, the solid line is the point estimate of the percentage of 
illegal user transactions and the dashed lines provide a 99% confidence interval using bootstrapped standard errors. 
The estimates come from a combination of two empirical models (the average of the estimates produced by the SLM 

























































2009 2011 2013 2015 2017
61 
 
Panel A: Estimated dollar volume of illegal and legal bitcoin user transactions per month  
  
Panel B: Estimated percentage illegal user dollar volume with 99% confidence bounds 
   
Figure 6 
Estimated dollar volume and percentage dollar volume of illegal bitcoin user transactions 
This figure illustrates the time-series of the estimated dollar volume of illegal and legal bitcoin user transactions per 
month (Panel A) and illegal user dollar volume as a percentage of total dollar volume of bitcoin transactions (Panel 
B). In Panel A, the dollar volume of legal user transactions is plotted with the solid line using the left-hand-side axis 
and the dollar volume of illegal user transactions is plotted with the dashed line using the right-hand-side axis. In 
Panel B, the solid line is the point estimate of the illegal dollar volume as a percentage of total dollar volume and the 
dashed lines provide a 99% confidence interval using bootstrapped standard errors. The estimates come from a 
combination of two empirical models (the average of the estimates produced by the SLM and DCE models). Values 
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Panel A: Estimated dollar value of illegal and legal user bitcoin holdings 
 
 
Panel B: Estimated percentage of illegal users bitcoin holdings with 99% confidence bounds 
  
Figure 7 
Estimated dollar value and percentage of illegal user bitcoin holdings 
This figure illustrates the time-series of the estimated dollar value of illegal and legal user bitcoin holdings (Panel A) 
and illegal user holdings as a percentage of total bitcoin holdings (Panel B). In Panel A, the dollar value of legal user 
bitcoin holdings is plotted with the solid line using the left-hand-side axis and the dollar value of illegal user 
holdings is plotted with the dashed line using the right-hand-side axis. In Panel B, the solid line is the point estimate 
of the illegal user holdings as a percentage of total bitcoin holdings and the dashed lines provide a 99% confidence 
interval using bootstrapped standard errors. The estimates come from a combination of two empirical models (the 
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